UNAMUNO'S USE OF PARADOX

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The purpose of this study is to make more familiar to the academic world, and to the readers in general, the value and importance of paradox as used in Miguel de Unamuno's writings. Thinking in a paradoxical mode frees one from the constraints of traditional and dogmatic conclusiveness.

Paradox entails the philosophy of contradiction as it is a harmonization of opposites. It not only involves irony and ambiguity, but also the inconsistencies of oxymoron and self-contradiction. These elements are not only useful to the literary spheres, but they also serve the cause of rationality and logic.

The force of paradox challenges the mind to consider reasons that a truism is not necessarily so. For example, paradox insinuates the chance of identicalness between such opposites as consciousness and nonconsciousness, reality and illusion, life and death, and existence and nonexistence.

Much of the literature of Spanish writers and philosophers, such as that of Unamuno, shows the technique of paradox to convince the reader that the harmonizing

of opposites more closely approaches truth and understanding than the customary utterances of dogmatic and conclusive facts. To counter-balance the traditional linear way of thinking with the more circular paradoxical manner that Unamuno uses in his literature may thus broaden the horizons of the reader's consciousness. This is how a survey of Unamuno's use of paradox as a rhetorical device in his literature contributes to the cause of enlightenment and knowledge.

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCING PARADOX

The aim of this chapter is to show how Unamuno uses paradox as a key rhetorical device in his works. Some of these works that best show his use of paradox will be cited as examples, but his final novel San Manuel Bueno, mártir (1933) (Obras completas 2 1113-54) will be shown to be the paradigm of Unamuno's involvement with paradox.

Unamuno's works apply all four senses of the following definition of paradox as listed in The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language:

> 1. A seemingly contradictory statement that may nonetheless be true. 2. A person, situation, or action exhibiting inexplicable or contradictory aspects. 3. An assertion that is essentially self-contradictory, although based on a valid deduction from acceptable premises. 4. A statement contrary to received opinion. (950)

Simple examples of paradox include: "I lie," "Never say never," "I am dogmatically against dogma," "I do not tolerate intolerance," "Thank God I'm an atheist," and "I conclude by saying that there cannot be any conclusion." Inconsistency, self-contradiction, antinomy, ambiguity, irony, oxymoron, and incongruity, if not all exactly synonymous with paradox, may nonetheless lend some further understanding. Etymologically, the word "paradox" is rooted in the Greek language (*para* = beyond, and *dokein* = to think).

The preliminary chapters of this thesis will explore some of Unamuno's works that will serve as stepping-stones for an analysis of paradox in his San Manuel Bueno, mártir. Unamuno's short poem "La oración del ateo" (1910) (Obras completas 6 359)makes its paradox obvious even from the title. The words of this poem imply a strong will to

believe, despite the inability to believe. In the opening line, the atheist asks God to hear his prayer while denying his deity's existence. Unamuno uses paradox to separate visceral instinctual faith from logical reason. Whereas reason depends on words, faith needs no language. Unamuno's words suggest that existence is a concept that one can experience only through reason, whereas faith is experienced without the limitations of language, definitions, or reason. To say that God exists is to define God. Definitions describe limitations. Because God, by definition, can have no limitations, God cannot be defined. Unamuno explains this paradox in lucid terms in his Del sentimiento trágico de la vida (1913):

> El conocimiento de Dios precede del amor a Dios, y es un conocimiento que poco o nada tiene de racional. Porque Dios es indefinible. Querer definir a Dios es pretender limitarlo en nuestra mente, es decir, matarlo. En cuanto tratamos de definirlo, nos surge la nada. (163)

This text in which Unamuno implies a definition of an indefinable deity also suggests the difference between cogent logical knowledge and visceral instinctual faith. It is this polemical dichotomy between reason and faith that engenders much of the paradox that Unamuno uses to help assuage his dilemma.

It is misleading to assume that Unamuno self-indulgently chooses paradox as a means to fulfill a fanciful desire. Such erroneous assumption understates the gravity of a force that demands recognition of its challenge. For Unamuno, paradox provides a higher level of understanding in exchange for total submission. It is this level of thought that rips away the shackles of conventional reflexive modes of thinking. Paradox emancipates Unamuno from the paralyzing traditionalism and dogma that he overcomes, and the only price for this freedom is his use of paradox that he so highly values. This is a price Unamuno gladly pays as the joy of the verbiage in his "La oración del ateo" reflects.

At the close of this poem, Unamuno has his atheist declaring " . . . Dios no existente, pues si Tú existieras / existiría yo también de veras" (Obras completas 6 359). Contrary to the Cartesian *cogito*, the lyrical voice of the atheist expresses doubt of his own existence, despite his obviously being conscious of his consciousness. His words suggest that the fact that he thinks does not necessarily prove that he exists. The text implies that it may be his nonexistent deity who is doing the thinking. At issue is what is or is not real.

For Unamuno, reality can be only relative. Some things can be less unreal than others, and paradox is the closest approximation to whatever passes for "real." Paradox unifies opposites and negates assumptions to dogma, and Unamuno uses paradox in his struggle against dialectic conclusion.

Unamuno draws from the influence of some of his predecessors as a means to justify his use of paradox. Most notable is the influence of the Hegelian Triadic Dialectic. This system rationalizes the perpetual flow and process of change. The circularity of flux forces the inevitable confrontation of every idea with its diametric opposite. Nietzsche shares this circularity in his concept of "eternal return," as did Heraclitus in his idea that nothing is permanent but change. Remarks by Valdés and Valdés not only relate to this hypothesis, but also hint at Unamuno's metafictional bent:

> Unamuno was thus developing a philosophy of 'being' recast in neo-Hegelian terms of being-in-struggle, an ethics of existential concern for the tragedy of man, and, in his later years, an aesthetics patterned on the self-realizing dialogue between author and reader. (An Unamuno Source Book xxxiv)

Valdés and Valdés also stress how the dualism of Hegel's Dialectic spurs Unamuno's enquiry and position that the process of existence is the union of polarities, and the way an object changes determines its reality.

The foregoing comments relate to the paradoxes inherent in Unamuno's metafiction because of the polarities of the dialectical process, the author-reader relationship, and the allusions to the impossibility of the existence of reality. Any abstract idea or concrete object eventually opposes itself, given enough change within its spiraling process of existence.

Valdés and Valdés imply that Unamuno regards existence and consciousness as being tragic. They interpret Unamuno's words as an insinuation that it is tragic to be either aware or unaware of the tragedy of existence. Unamuno bemoans this tragedy while exalting its necessity, and he substantiates this paradox with his aversion to systematize or organize his thought. In order to express his disdain for the Hegelian dialectical system, he embraces it. Unamuno does this by challenging thesis with antithesis without concluding with a synthesis. Paradoxically, his denial of Hegelian conclusion concurs with Hegel because the latter's synthesis is automatically a new nonconcluding thesis.

The Unamunian circularity or spiraling effect of simultaneous affirmation and negation serves to authenticate paradox in this way: to ponder, even for a moment, the authenticity of paradox means that when the reader returns to his or her previous linear dogmatic ways of thinking, the newly acquired broader perspective will enable the reader to transcend the former and narrower way. Even the slightest understanding of paradox expands the horizons of consciousness leading to the stimulation of a fresh and vibrant skepticism. Unamuno explains:

> El escéptico en este sentido se opone al dogmático como el hombre que busca se opone al hombre que afirma antes de toda rebusca. El escéptico estudia para ver qué solución pueda encontrar, y puede ser que no encuentre ninguna. El dogmático no busca más que pruebas para apoyar un dogma al que se ha adherido antes de encontrarlas. (Obras completas 7 345)

These words of Unamuno suggest that an inexhaustible amount of proof is available to support any dogma that is already firmly established. Unamuno also shows that these erroneously assumed "truths," unconsciously absorbed by the populace and euphemistically labeled as "conventional wisdom," remain "true" because the masses are too limited to doubt or question them. Unamuno's skepticism earns him the label of "heretic," while his deeper thinking strengthens his personal faith in the need to question collective dogmatic faith, also known as unquestionable "common sense." Unamuno compares and contrasts "common sense" and paradox:

> He dicho exageraciones paradójicas. Y es que lo que llamamos paradoja es el más eficaz correctivo de las ramplonerías y perogrulladas del sentido común. La paradoja es lo que más se opone al sentido común, y toda verdad científica nueva tiene que aparecer como paradoja a los del sentido común en seco. (Obras completas 3 551)

Sense, meaning, or "logic" that is most widespread and believed by the greatest amount of people for the longest time is called "common sense." To the most pragmatic and dogmatic mind, this is the ultimate reduction and should never be questioned. This is the linear attitude, built upon millennia of erroneous assumptions that Unamuno seeks to supplant with the paradoxical approach. He uses paradox as a means to engage the prevailing questions about what it is that constitutes truth, knowledge, and reality. The fact that there can be no absolute conclusions keeps the consciousness in a perpetual state of chaotic perplexity, and it is out of this struggle that Unamuno takes the Kierkegaardian "leap to faith." This instantaneous creation of subjective belief, once achieved, is dialectically challenged by the logic that faith bypasses and tries to replace. Unamuno deals with the opposing poles of logic and faith by using Hegel's paradoxical Triadic Dialectic.

Unamuno's belief that he creates from the faith that springs from the chaos of visceral emotion provides temporary relief from the linguistic perplexity of logic. Nonetheless, faith is restricted to the subjectivity of the individual. Faith also depends on the support of its antithetical reason, whose logic is the doubt that paradoxically challenges faith while simultaneously sustaining it. Unamuno says:

> Razón y fe son dos enemigos que no pueden sostenerse el uno sin el otro. Lo irracional pide ser racionalizado, y la razón sólo puede operar sobre lo irracional. Tienen que apoyarse uno en otro y asociarse. Pero asociarse en lucha, ya que la lucha es un modo de asociación. (Del sentimiento trágico de la vida 116)

The above quote by Unamuno is paradoxical because he says that reason and faith are enemies that depend on each other for their maintenance. His words imply that irrationality in general, and the irrationality of this paradox in particular, demand to be rationalized through reason that can work only through irrationality. This process begins with the individual's relationship with words. This association engenders the conflict of opposites that leads to struggle as a way of association. The concept of defining an entity by that which it is not, provides enough opposition to engender a wealth of paradox.

Unamuno's words suggest that struggle is a way to associate faith with reason. Whereas the visceral essence of faith ignores, bypasses, and transcends language, the concrete objective essence of reason depends on language. Words enable the individual to associate faith with reason. The mind struggles for language with which to associate entities through the obstacles of opposition, but the arbitrary and enigmatic nature of language also paradoxically encourages associations from these impediments.

Unamuno's struggle as a means of association implies affinity of struggle with language. He says that reason and faith are interdependent enemies. Reason needs language, while faith does not. Reason needs one's faith in the language that substantiates

reason, and faith needs one's ability to reason that faith brings consolation. The paradoxical association of reason and faith, based on the implication of Unamuno's words, results in a synthesis of mutual dependence.

Notwithstanding, reason and faith are enemies because the former doubts the latter, while seeming to envy the latter's freedom from language. Reason and faith engage in a conflict in which neither can conquer the other, while they seem to keep trying to do so. Unamuno voices his approval and support of this symbiotic interdependence. In Del sentimiento trágico de la vida, he remarks: " . . . y por mi parte no quiero poner paz entre mi corazón y mi cabeza, entre mi fe y mi razón; quiero más bien que se peleen entre sí" (123). Another of Unamuno's comments reflects his advocacy of the struggle between reason and faith: "Por la guerra es como aprenden a conocerse y, como consecuencia de ello a quererse, vencedores y vencidos" (117). Unamuno uses reason and faith so that each creates the other, and this interaction between the two never reaches the synthesis of conquest. He also combines the above Hegelian system with the Kierkegaardian "leap to faith." He thus "makes believe," as described by the verbs "crear-creer."

Ultimately, Unamuno persuades his readers that whatever he says and whatever is the opposite of what he says are simultaneously both true and false. He longs for his longing to remain unfulfilled. He delights in rationalizing irrationality, and showing to what extreme he can wax paradoxical. He says:

> Y el alma, mi alma al menos, anhela otra cosa; no absorción, no quietud, no paz, no apagamiento, sino eterno acercarse sin llegar nunca, inacabable anhelo, eterna esperanza que eternamente se renueva sin acabarse del todo nunca. Y con ello un eterno carecer de algo y un dolor eterno. Un dolor, una pena, gracias a la cual se crece sin cesar en conciencia y en anhelo. (Del sentimiento trágico de la vida 236)

Unamuno's words imply the paradoxical passion for passion unfulfilled. He rationalizes this paradox with Hegel's Dialectic. For example, if Unamuno's "longing"

represents the Thesis of Hegel's Dialectic, Unamuno's "longing fulfilled" would represent the challenging Antithesis. Although Unamuno stops short of allowing a concluding Synthesis that would be a new "longing," the original "longing" remains anyway, because Unamuno's foregoing quote implies that "longing fulfilled" and "longing unfulfilled" are one and the same.

Unamuno's omission of the final stage (Synthesis) matters not in this case, since automatically it would have been a new Thesis to be challenged by a new Antithesis, ad infinitum. As Götz observes: "Inspired by Hegel's dialectic, Unamuno rejected as tragic any static view of life and reality. No final synthesis for him, in this life or the next" (72). Despite Götz's statement, the Synthesis of Hegel's Dialectic is neither static nor final. Otherwise, Unamuno would not have accepted this system, given his aversion to conclusion. Nonetheless, Götz shows a clear understanding of Unamunian paradox:

> In his comments on Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik, Unamuno wrote: "The opposites of dialectic exist together and their only posible union is the process of existence itself." That is, polar notions are not true at the expense of each other. Rather, they are true only when they are present together, and any effort to prefer one over the other is a betrayal of the very reality of existing. (71)

Götz also cites detractors such as Friedrich Waismann, who sees paradoxes as resulting from a careless use of words that should never be allowed to arise (71). To say what should or should not be has no impact upon the fact of its being. The word "should," in this case, reflects subjective criteria that are irrelevant to any scientific system of proof. Paradoxically, however, to make dogmatic pronouncements about Waismann's inflexibility supports his argument. For one to protest Waismann's premise against paradox only adds fuel to his dogmatic position. The unprovable proof of paradox is the impossibility of absolute proof. Any apparent or approximate truth may be proven only within the limited context of a given linguistic scientific system.

The above clarification of paradox shows its simultaneous negating and affirming nature, and why Unamuno is convincing in his use of paradox. His words show impatience with the detractors who try to sway him to write in a mode contrary to his unconventional ambiguous nature. In the Socratic style, Unamuno tries to awaken his audience to a deeper level of thought that violates established fallacies and disrupts received dogma. Paradoxically, the frustration resulting from the demands of his detractors further stimulates Unamuno's literary productivity.

Unamuno protests against his "good friends" who try to bring him down to their level of mediocrity:

> Hay amigos, y buenos amigos, que me aconsejan que me deje de esta labor y me recoja a hacer lo que llaman una obra objetiva, "algo que sea, dicen, definitivo, algo de construcción, algo duradero." Quieren decir algo dogmático. Me declare incapaz de ello y reclame mi libertad, mi santa libertad, hasta la de contradecirme, si llega el caso. (Obras completas 3 263)

Unamuno's words imply that he holds sacred his freedom to be contradictory and paradoxical, not only in his literature, but also in whatever facet of his existence that one might consider to be apart from his literature. His metafictional bent, as reflected in Niebla, for example, reflects the inseparable and intimate intertwining of Unamuno's writing, thinking, and being. These three states constitute a simultaneous unity that describes Unamuno, and his words invariably imply this conscientiously uncompromising conviction. Unamuno never contradicts his rigid claim for self-contradiction.

In The Lone Heretic (1963), Rudd discusses how the concept of paradox, conflict, and contradiction took root when Unamuno read Donoso's comments about human reason loving the absurd. Rudd says of Unamuno: "Already he had grasped the paradox of the absurd, long before he read of it in Kierkegaard" (37-38).

Rudd traces the development of Unamuno's use of paradox as a rhetorical device. She notes that his thought reflects studies of writers that pre-date his appropriation of the Hegelian and Kierkegaardian concepts. She cites these prior authors.

Rudd observes extreme paradoxes in Unamuno's ideas on religion. These stem from his struggle with his childhood faith in opposition to his later sense of reason. Unamuno sees propagation as "original sin" which spawns "an inevitable contradiction, the paradox of Christianity." Rudd cites Unamuno's idea that one should revile propagation for its sinfulness, while praising it because it sustains the human race (153-54).

The foregoing self-contradiction of Unamuno implies that he uses paradox as a refuge from the compulsion to question the need for existence. Unamuno fears celibacy because it would make humanity extinct. He fears the loss of self-identity and consciousness that mortality entails. He fails to probe beneath the surface of the celibacy/propagation paradox. He does not question the need for the human race to persist in the first place. He does not wonder about the need for anything to have ever existed. If there were no life or consciousness, there would be no conscious creature to bemoan or rue such an absence or void. The possible passage of trillions of centuries of past nonexistence seems not to worry any mind, but Unamuno never discusses this. He seems unable to think beyond the fact of existence as the ultimate monadic reduction.

Existence comes from its parent nonexistence, and number one is an offspring of zero. Therefore, what Unamuno does not say helps readers to analyze what he does say, because a thing is defined by what it is not. There is a cause/effect relationship between Unamuno's fear of loss of consciousness and his inability to conceive of it. His following words provoke a consideration of the possibilities of this relationship:

> Imposible no es, en efecto, concebirnos como no existentes, sin que haya esfuerzo alguno que baste a que la conciencia se dé cuenta de la absoluta inconciencia, de su propio anonadamiento. Intenta, lector, imaginarte en plena vela cuál sea el estado de tu alma en el profundo sueño; trata de llenar tu conciencia con la representación de la no conciencia, y lo verás. Causa congojosísimo vértigo el empeñarse en comprenderlo. No podemos concebirnos como no existiendo. (Del sentimiento trágico de la vida 52-53)

The above text of Uamuno declares that it is impossible to conceive of a total cosmic void or lack of consciousness because to do so requires an act of consciousness. Such a hypothesis can exist only as an idea or concept, and ideas or concepts can exist only if and when there is a consciousness to accommodate them. Unamuno's view on this is paradoxical because while he says that it is impossible to conceive of a total nonexistence of consciousness, he is simultaneously conceiving of this hypothesis. His view is also nonparadoxical because he is conceiving only of the fact that such a hypothesis is impossible, and not of the hypothesis, per se. Thus, the overall paradox in this case is the contradiction between a situation being at once paradoxical and nonparadoxical.

One must keep trying to grasp paradox in order to perceive the slightest clarity in Unamuno's works. He keeps himself and his readers in a perpetual state of perplexity, confusion, and discontent, while pursuing the struggle against these conditions. Above all, he disdains peace, preferring the glory achieved through the anguish of agitation and chaos. Every instant of consciousness must be filled with doubt and inquiry. The glory of the problem is in the dialectical process of questioning with the rejection of any complacent submission to dogmatic solutions.

Unamuno's closing statement in his Del sentimiento trágico de la vida is the following message to his readers whom he paradoxically intends to distract from their distractions: "Y perdona si te he molestado más de lo debido e inevitable, más de lo que,

al tomar la pluma para distraerte un poco de tus distracciones, me propuse. ¡Y Dios no te dé paz y sí gloria!" (295). Unamuno prefers to suffer eternally the cost for maintaining the glory of identity and immortal consciousness. He dreads peaceful oblivion because it disallows the consciousness necessary to experience it. For him, peace is a delusion of temporary relief between two episodes of anguish. Peace lets one nurse wounds while girding for the next onslaught.

Unamuno's words imply that he values peace, but since it is unattainable, he pragmatically abandons any hope for it. Instead, he accepts struggle as the necessary condition of existence. Unamuno's words suggest that he prefers the realistic candor of war to the deceptive treachery of what seems to be peace. Strife and anguish mobilize him to take action, whereas peace immobilizes and leads to false complacency. Unamuno paradoxically gains peace by scorning it. He says, "La paz es la sumisión y la mentira. Ya conoces mi divisa: primero la verdad que la paz. Antes quiero verdad en guerra que no mentira en paz" (Obras completas 3 269).

Unamuno's expressions of paradox do not always invite praise from his critics. For example, Julián Marías notes what may be interpreted as weaknesses in Unamuno:

> . . . life is a dream, yet he says that it is the authentic reality. This is what has generally been interpreted as a *paradox*, a word which greatly annoyed Don Miguel because he realized there was a lack of understanding behind it . . . he lacked the intellectual means to comprehend his deepest intuitions. (71)

In response to Marías, one could question whether any "intellectual means" could be applied to comprehend any intuitions; deep, shallow, or otherwise. The very subjective and introspective nature of intuition precludes the pragmatic concreteness of rational and scientific analysis. Within the Hegelian Triadic Dialectic, Unamuno challenges the thesis of rationality with the antithesis of intuition by applying the Kierkegaardian "leap to

faith." Contrary to the assertions of Marías, Unamuno knows better than to try to use intellect or logic as a means to "comprehend his deepest intuitions."

To describe Unamuno's "comprehension" of intuition entails his convoluted paradoxical application of words. He uses language to reason the fact that faith, unlike reason, needs no language. He uses language to communicate to the world that language forces the conclusion that he strives so passionately to avoid. This paradox, true to its contradictory nature, concludes with its negation of conclusion. In Del sentimiento trágico de la vida, Unamuno's words imply that nothing can exist without contradiction: "Como que sólo vivimos de contradicciones, . . . " (31).

With the mind thus conditioned to paradoxical contradiction, one may consider the long history of paradox in literature in general, and Western philosophical literature in particular. The influences seen in Unamuno's works reflect Hellenic antiquity, deriving from the pre-Socratics.

In a critique discussing pre-Socratic influences that appear in some of Unamuno's works, Pascual Mezquita cites some paradoxical Heraclitian/Parmenidian hypotheses: "Con este trabajo se pretende dar una visión más ajustada de la dialéctica unamuniana en relación con el pensamiento de Heráclito, relación no suficientemente estudiada hasta hoy" (189). Mindful of Unamuno as a Hellenist, Pascual Mezquita is referring to the influence that some of the pre-Socratic philosophers such as Heraclitus and Parmenides exert upon Unamuno's thought. Heraclitus says, "You can't step in the same river twice," and "Everything changes but change itself" (Palmer 22).

Heraclitus believes that nothing is in a state of existence, but everything is in a process of becoming. To the contrary, Parmenides believes that reality is absolute, and

motion is impossible (Palmer 26-27). Zeno of Elea explains why " . . . motion would be impossible even if it were possible" (Palmer 29). This is a strong and direct representation of paradox.

Pascual Mezquita comments, "Muchos conceptos historicistas de Unamuno . . . pueden ser mejor interpretados si se analizan desde la dialéctica heraclítea . . ." (189). Pascual Mezquita exemplifies this comment with " . . . la dialéctica unamuniana consiste en la afirmación simultánea de los contrarios alternativos, sin posible conciliación" (195).

Pascual Mezquita cites paradoxical elements of Hegel's dialectical process that Unamuno's Paz en la guerra (1897) reflects:

> Para el rector salmantino, la guerra constituye parte esencial de la historia y la sociedad humana, pues la dialéctica que acarrea es fecunda al estar internamente enriquecida con las posiciones contrarias; cualquier discurso, cualquier argumentación, cualquier pensamiento rico en contradicciones es rico en consistencias, porque es capaz de abrazar dialécticamente las perspectivas contrarias del tema o problema en cuestión . . . (195)

The foregoing quote relates to Unamuno's essay "Ni lógica ni dialéctica, sino polémica," in which Unarauno declares:

> La dialéctica está llena de contradicciones íntimas, y por eso es fecunda. La dialéctica es el proceso de las antinomias y las antítesis. La dialéctica es lo menos dogmático que cabe, y por muy apasionada que sea, siempre, en el fondo, es escéptica. (Obras completas 3 747)

Thus Unamunian paradox shows Classical Greek as well as the later Nordic influences.

As Unamuno venerates and emulates the iconoclastic icon of a Socratic gadfly, the reader apprehensively hangs onto Unamuno's every word, ever anticipating the crude clash of an Unamunian self-contradiction. One becomes increasingly aware that Unamuno is simultaneously expressing exactly how he feels and the exact opposite of

how he feels. Unamuno's words imply his intent that his readers maintain the creative and productive tension that reflects and engenders the glory of his paradox.

This works for Unamuno and it serves his paradox-loving readers. By way of agitating stimuli in the Socratic mode, Unamuno aims to provoke his readers to accept no dogma, and to question every idea and every idea's antithetical possibility.

The title of Unamuno's first novel Paz en la guerra (1897) describes an idea ("paz") within an opposite idea ("guerra"). Unamuno uses this device as a means to condition the mind of the reader to become familiar with paradox. The above example of this device is a precursor to what Unamuno says thirteen years later, when his essay "Mi religión" shows further examples of paradox:

> Y me pasaré la vida luchando con el misterio y aun sin esperanza de penetrarlo, porque esa lucha es mi alimento y es mi consuelo. Sí, mi consuelo. Me he acostumbrado a sacar esperanza de la desesperación misma. Y no griten: "Paradoja," los mentecatos y los superficiales. (Obras completas 3 261)

Unamuno's hope in desperation parallels his finding peace in war. These are examples of the poetic bent and paradoxical word couplings both flowing at once from each other. Unamuno's words imply that his hope springs from the hopelessness from whose depths one can only upward surge. What he says suggests that he paradoxically finds comfort in the discomfort of his struggles. His words imply his pride in being paradoxical while berating those who use "paradox" as a term of contempt.

For Unamuno, the hope that springs from desperation also begets desperation, hopelessness, and doubt. His words reflect the influence of Hegel's Triadic Dialectic that structures the paradoxical circularity of Unamuno's thought. The following chapter discusses and explains how Unamuno's first novel reflects his use of this Hegelian system.

Chapter 2, "Hegelian paradox in Unamuno's Paz en la guerra (1897)", cites various passages from this novel. Unamuno uses paradox to paint a poetic portrait, and this application of paradox directly relates to the dynamic mechanism of Hegel's Triadic Dialectic. This following chapter shows how Unamuno's words imply that paradox can broaden the horizons of the reader's consciousness, while swaying the reader to embrace paradox as a valid component of the thought process. This involves the arbitrariness of language and its interrelationship with paradox. Because one relies on language in order to discuss the unreliability of language, such discussion is a paradoxical self-negation. This antinomy invites the Hegelian Triadic Dialectic, as well as this comment by George Steiner:

> The median nature of language is an epistemological commonplace. So is the fact that every general statement worth making about language invites a counter-statement or antithesis. In its formal structure, as well as in its dual focus, internal and external, the discussion of language is unstable and dialectical. (123)

This quote relates to Unamunian paradox in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 2
HEGELIAN PARADOX IN UNAMUNO'S PAZ EN LA GUERRA (1897)

This chapter will show how Unamuno's use of Hegelian paradox in Paz en la guerra, as well as in most of his other works, is based on a relatively simple premise. The supposition is that each and every entity, be it abstract concept or concrete object, either does or does not exist. Within a nonparadoxical realm, these are the only two possibilities. Within paradox, however, Hegel provides a third possibility: that an entity can simultaneously exist and not exist.

Unamuno's Paz en la guerra reflects the influence of Hegel's paradoxical system of Triadic Dialectic, in which the challenging of a thesis by its antithesis resolves in a synthesis. This system is paradoxical because the synthesis automatically becomes a new thesis to be challenged by a new antithesis, ad infinitum. This tension of diametric opposites suits Unamuno because of his aversion to dogmatic conclusiveness.

The paradoxical nature of Paz en la guerra begins with the title itself, in which Unamuno implies the first two components of Hegel's Triadic Dialectic, as represented by the thesis "paz" and the antithesis "guerra." As the title of this novel suggests, Unamuno reaches no resolving synthesis for the concepts of peace and war. The title implies that peace is an anomalous and fleeting break within the permanent background of war, analogous to the concept that a momentary spark of stability is only part of the more permanent conflagration of chaos. Unamuno's words imply this concept of peace as an episodic distortion within the standard state of strife. The popular assumption of peace as the natural human condition, with war as an unusual event, stems from human denial

and wishful thinking. In contrast to this excessive optimism, Unamuno's literature often implies a reverence for the inevitability of adversity. His words suggest that he conquers strife by pursuing it. Unamuno paradoxically tries to escape discord as he seeks it. He expresses the deception of peace in a way that is analogous to the vision of an idyllic rustic pond, beneath whose tranquil surface prevails the violence of the big fish eating the little fish. In Paz en la guerra, he writes:

> En la monotonía de su vida gozaba Pedro Antonio de la novedad de cada minuto, del deleite de hacer todos los días las mismas cosas y de la plenitud de su limitación. . . Fluía su existencia como corriente de río manso, con rumor no oído y de que no se daría cuenta hasta que se interrumpiera. (Obras completas 2 95)

Unamuno's foregoing words imply his attempt to raise the reader's belief in a truth that is stronger for being expressed through three paradoxes. Unamuno's oxymorons and self-contradictory statements are valid and authentic despite their presenting of oppositions. The paradox of polarized possibilities leads the reader to a deeper understanding that transcends stark statistical objectivity. Because Unamuno uses only the first two components of Hegel's Triadic Dialectic, it is moot whether or not one could technically call this an authentic application of Hegel's system. Unamuno rejects the Synthesis of this Triad because it suggests conclusion, even though the Synthesis is automatically a new Thesis. This neutralization of the Synthesis renders it both existent and nonexistent. Unamuno is mindful of this paradox, as the following discussion of the three sets of opposing terms in the above quote will show.

Regarding the first set ("monotonía"/"novedad"), Unamuno has his character Pedro Antonio enjoying the novelty of his monotony. This text implies that monotony can be a novelty if one is suddenly inspired by the comforting reassurance that monotony can provide within an otherwise chaotic existence. Being aware of one's gratitude for such

comforting familiarity is the novelty of the monotony. Interpreted within Hegel's Triadic Dialectic, it is this "comfort" that could be seen as the Synthesis for the Thesis of "monotony" challenged by the Antithesis of "novelty."

With the second set ("plenitud"/"limitación"), Pedro Antonio delights in the fullness of his limitations. In a particular sense, this is not paradoxical because the fullness is from the character's view and the limitations are from Unamuno's view. Through the prisms and filters of the Hegelian Triadic Dialectic, there are many potential analyses of what Unamuno's words imply, especially regarding the sets of opposing words in question. Within Hegel's system, "fullness" could conceivably represent the Synthesis of knowing the difference between the Thesis of "courageously applying one's potential to improve a given situation" and the challenging Antithesis of "serene acceptance of one's limitations." It is Unamuno's appropriation of Hegel that lends this vehicle for oxymoronic word couplings. These polarities engender the paradoxes that Unamuno expresses in his perpetual struggle simultaneously to affirm and negate that which is supposed to be "real" and "true."

The third set of opposing terms at issue in this passage within Paz en la guerra is "rumor no oído." This simple and direct self-contradicting oxymoron is a typically Unamunian gadfly that prods the reader away from traditional assumptions. Applying the classical metaphor of water, one could say that Unamuno dwells beneath the shallow surface of appearances and his readers either join him in his profundity or ignore the urgency to deep thought. The latter choice may result in guilt of ignoring, or "guilty innocence." This may ensue when one refuses to surrender the comfort of not knowing.

The cited portion of the text implies that Pedro Antonio's existence flows like a river current with a "soundless noise" whose silence can be interrupted only by the presence of an eardrum to receive the sound waves that would neutralize the silence and actualize the noise. This situation is practically identical to the enigma of whether or not a tree falling in a forest makes a sound if no living creature is around to hear it. Within Hegel's Triadic Dialectic, the paradox of "rumor no oído" may be resolved by positing "rumor" as Thesis, "no oído" as the challenging Antithesis, and the "impact of the sound waves upon the eardrum" as Synthesis. The presence of the eardrum acts as the obstacle that interrupts the heretofore unimpeded and unnoticed flow of the sound waves.

This is what Unamuno's words imply in Paz en la guerra. The eardrum as obstacle to the flow of sound waves is an elucidating metaphor for Unamuno's concept of the impossibility of an absolute void of consciousness. This concept of such impossibility is paradoxical because Unamuno is conceiving of the impossibility while saying that he cannot conceive of it. Even though one needs consciousness in order to think about its nonexistence, the required consciousness does not necessarily negate its hypothetical nonexistence. Both this premise and Unamuno's opposing idea are valid, and the reader may more readily find this fact obvious through experimentation rather than by trying to decipher further verbal explanation. Nonetheless, saying that words cannot clarify what one is trying to say is paradoxically a clarification. Relevant to this enigma is the aforementioned analogy of the eardrum.

As the eardrum interrupts the flow of the sound waves, consciousness interrupts the unstable Heraclitian flow of the nonexistence of consciousness. Based on the premise, easily filtered through Hegel's Triadic Dialectic, that all existence stems from the instability of nothingness, these Heraclitian and Hegelian influences upon

Unamuno's thought legitimize the paradoxes that appear in Paz en la guerra. The "novelty of monotony," the "fullness of limitations," and "soundless noise" that Unamuno expresses in this novel have in common their relevance to nothingness because the two components of each oxymoron negate each other to the void that Unamuno dreads.

Unamuno fears the oblivion of tranquil nonexistence. He prefers immortality and eternal consciousness, no matter how painful and anguished. He desires the glory of self-identity through suffering rather than the peace of oblivion. Therefore he closes his Del sentimiento trágico de la vida with a seemingly paradoxical blessing. He places peace and glory in mutual opposition, even though they tend to concur: "¡Y Dios no te dé paz y sí gloria!" (295). This is in contrast to Unamuno's title Paz en la guerra, which implies a mutual agreement of peace and war despite their joint opposition. Thus Unamuno further exemplifies his paradoxical bent by making synonyms antonymous, and antonyms synonymous.

Less obvious are Unamuno's paradoxical subtleties. He challenges the minds of his readers by keeping his intent obscure and enigmatic. Unamuno seems unable to understand that without consciousness, one cannot be conscious of the absence of consciousness. In such a state, one could not experience even a split second of eternity. Yet it is such an eternity without consciousness that Unamuno so morbidly fears. In question is whether or not he really fears this, or he is feigning the fear as a ploy to confound the reader with further paradox. Nonetheless, despite the reader's need for proof, Unamuno gains his reader's faith in the sincerity of his literature that shows feelings about consciousness and its hypothetical absence.

Relevant to his struggles with these feelings, Del sentimiento trágico de la vida shows Unamuno discussing Hegel's concepts regarding the Deity, consciousness, and nothingness. He cites Hegel's idea that pure being and pure nothingness are identical. Based on this, the pure being of Unamuno's fear of an eternity devoid of consciousness is negated by the pure nothingness or nonexistence of this fear. This idea of Hegel lends theoretical support to Unamunian self-contradiction and paradox even to the level of absurdity. If pure being and pure nothingness are identical, then existence and nonexistence are likewise identical. For this reason, Unamuno places his deity in a realm of "superexistence" that transcends all subordinate levels of existence and nonexistence. Whenever language and its offspring logic become too absurd for Unamuno, he deals with them by leaping to the solace of faith that he can feel without thinking. In so doing, faith gives him the "paz" within the "guerra" of reason that fails him. Unamuno says:

> Y el Dios lógico o racional, el Dios obtenido por vía de negación, el ente sumo, se sume, como realidad, en la nada, pues el ser puro y la pura nada, según enseñaba Hegel, se identifican. Y el Dios cordial o sentido, el Dios de los vivos, es el Universo mismo personalizado, es la Conciencia del Universo. (Del sentimiento trágico de la vida 165)

Despite the initial impression one may receive from the concept of equating God with nothingness, such a proceeding on Unamuno's part reflects his spirituality. His literature shows the randomness and deception of words, despite his most skillful choices of language. Unamuno's words imply his search for truth that he knows to be unattainable, but approachable through paradox. "God" cannot be God, who by definition transcends definition. "Nothingness" cannot be nothing because it is imbued with properties, such as instability. This "God/nothingness" coupling, as Unamuno's words imply, is key to understanding his struggle between reason and faith, consciousness and its absence, reality and illusion, agreement and contradiction, and many other dichotomies,

including God's controversial existence. In Del sentimiento trágico de la vida, Unamuno shows further evidence of Hegelian influence, even if only to contradict Hegel. Saying "razón construye sobre irracionalidades" implies that reality is built upon fantasy:

> Hegel hizo célebre su aforismo de que todo lo racional es real y todo lo real racional; pero somos muchos los que, no convencidos por Hegel, seguimos creyendo que lo real, lo realmente real, es irracional: que la razón construye sobre irracionalidades. Hegel, gran definidor, pretendió reconstruir el universo con definiciones, como aquel sargento de Artillería decía que se construyen los cañones tomando un agujero y recubriéndolo de hierro. (24)

Unamuno's metaphor of the hole of the cannon implies the importance of nothingness. His words suggest that the hole takes precedence over the iron that surrounds it. The words that Unamuno uses in his critique of Hegel's thought imply Unamuno's paradoxical acceptance and rejection of Hegelian influence. The implication is that the cannon poses a dichotomy. Hegel's "real/rational" cannon contains within it a nothingness. Unamuno counters this fact by highlighting the nothingness, or the hole in the cannon as the subject around which the cannon happens to be constructed. Paradoxically the Hegelian Dialectic influences Unamuno in this way: the cannon is the Thesis. The hole is the Antithesis. The Synthesis is the instability of the becoming. The ongoing corrosion and eventual disintegration of the metal of the cannon becomes subordinate to the everlasting nothingness of its hole. The cycle then renews itself via the instability of the conquering nothingness, resurrecting the dust of the cannon through whatever transformation of matter/ energy, in an infinite circularity of creation and destruction.

In the above case, the texts suggest authenticity in both opposing views. Hegel equates reality with reason. Unamuno suggests equating reality with non-reason. He also validates Hegel's position with the paradox-engendering fallacy of language. If paradox

arises from the fallacy of language, the ultimate paradox of such fallacy is that only through language can one show its fallacy. Chiasmically, proof of fallacy lies in fallacy of the proof. To say that nothing is more paradoxical than nothing is a clear and terse example of the fallacy of language.

Hegel's chiasmic concept of "rational=real/real=rational" is dogmatically concrete enough to invite Unamuno's paradoxical agreement and opposition. Hegel's Dialectic systematically poses the Thesis of nothingness, and challenges it with the Antithesis of something, resulting in the Synthesis of the instability of becoming. Thus, to perceive nothingness is to perceive something. Scientists lend further support to the authenticity of nothingness by saying that nature abhors a vacuum. Nature's perpetual struggle simultaneously against both the nothingness of nonexistence and the being of existence describes cycles of creation and destruction. This perspective lends legitimacy to paradox in general, and to Unamuno's use of paradox in particular for this study. Viewed this way, paradox is the mainstream norm, and dogma is the marginalized anomalous "other" that is commonly received as unquestionable truth.

Nothingness gives rise to the instability whose chaos becomes filtered through the kaleidoscope of cosmic symmetry. Schopenhauer tempers and assuages his pessimism with the harmonious balm of balanced point/counterpoint, and Blanco Aguinaga ponders paradoxical Unamuno's Paz en la guerra:

> Ha sido el silencio el último elemento que ha llevado a Pachico a la visión más alta y honda; lo negativo ya positivo que sirve de base a la paradoja lírica de lo inefable: la "canción silenciosa," la "callada sinfonía" que Pachico escucha; paradoja última por medio de la cual todos los elementos de la realidad se pierden en sus contrarios y es posible la comunión y entrada en lo continuo eterno donde lo uno es ya lo otro, Todo y Nada, Vida y Muerte. (71)

The above quote (especially the last six words) implies the identicalness of opposites to which Unamuno applies the Hegelian Dialectic. His Paz en la guerra subjects the character to some of the novel's many paradoxes, such as peace in war. The character's personal experiences also reflect *intrahistoria.*

This Unamunian idea derives from the Hegelian concept of *volksgeist* ("spirit of the people"). Within Hegel's Triadic Dialectic, Unamuno's *intrahistoria* is an Antithesis that challenges the Thesis of history as an official recorded chronology, which obviously entails a specific period of time. The more visceral *intrahistoria* involves time in a different way. Unamuno uses a technique in mixing the monotony of everyday happenings (the *paz* of *intrahistoria*) with official statistics (the *guerra* of recorded history). The former involves subjective individual perceptions of time, whereas the latter deals with a more objective and collective sense of time. Blanco Aguinaga's discussion of the time element sheds further light on the issue:

> Lo primero que nos anuncia es la fusión de los tres tiempos del hombre en uno: "Su pasado le derrama en el alma una luz tierna y difusa; siente una paz honda . . . de sus recuerdos esperanza de vida eterna". Están aquí separados los tres tiempos porque el hombre no puede discursivamente fundirlos, pero nótese cómo fluyen el uno en el otro por gracia de la oración continua que tiene como centro esa *paz honda* del presente en que todo se armoniza. El pasado está vivido ahora en la nostalgia quieta y tranquila; ahora también está vivido el futuro en la tranquila y quieta esperanza. La "luz tierna y difusa" envuelve en continuidad a los tres tiempos, difuminando con su magia los escollos de la secuencia. (65)

Thus Blanco Aguinaga explains how perceptions of time in Paz en la guerra interrelate with one's potential sense of peace, even in the midst of war.

Time is fallacious and deceptive because its perception is so dependent upon, not only individual subjectivity, but a given train of thought. For example, pain seems endless, while pleasure seems to negate time's existence. History, as regarded by Unamuno in Paz en la guerra, is well suited for the Dialectic. Official recorded history,

Unamuno's idea of intrahistoria, and its parent Hegelian volksgeist are adaptable to Hegel's Triadic Dialectic, and thereby subject to paradoxes. As Palmer observes:

> According to Hegel, even though the mind does have a universal, abstract structure, its content changes evolutionarily from period to period. There exists a mode of philosophical introspection which reveals the general structure of Mind and even allows us to reconstruct history in an a priori manner. (224-25)

Unamuno's use of paradox as a rhetorical device reflects some of the Hegelian influence expressed in the above quote. Like Hegel, Unamuno sees history as flowing and dynamic in the Heraclitian sense. That is, a chronological list of historical events is perpetually reinterpreted by individual subjective minds. While it remains the "same" history, it constantly "changes."

It is in this way that Unamuno's literary technique of paradox works. The text of his Paz en la guerra shows examples of how he vivifies situations through paradoxical rhetoric. He thus portrays the feelings of his protagonist:

> . . . interesado en la variedad del paisaje, en el descubrimiento de un nuevo árbol, de una ignorada umbría, de una casería desconocida para él hasta entonces; en esto interesado, lo mismo que los asistentes al Casino en cada nueva combinación de las cartas en las vicisitudes del juego de naipes, y su tío en la metódica sucesión de sus íntimas devociones y en los variados accidentes del combate de su alma con el demonio. ¡Siempre todo nuevo y todo siempre viejo en el perdurable cambio, sobre la eterna inmutabilidad de las cosas! (Obras completas 2 264-65)

In the final sentence of the above quote, Unamuno is applying paradox as a means to express delusions of familiarity. One assumes a thing as being old or monotonous through its seeming familiarity, only to rediscover it at another moment, through a different mental and/or emotional perspective. All entities and situations, be they concrete or abstract, show their essences through subjective perceptions at a given instance. Whereas objects may appear to remain unchanging, the impressions that the observer perceives from them constantly change. Thus the "objective " reality of their existence

lies in the subjectivity of the beholder. Moreover, because all entities are in a "state" of becoming, to target their essences is like trying to board a moving train. The train was already in a process of spatial change, and it becomes further modified upon boarding it.

Unamuno's use of paradox is his way of dealing with the simultaneous antonymity and synonymity of polarities. Through this literary technique Unamuno suspends the habitual disbelief in his readers, while awakening in them a dormant belief in oppositions. Unamuno's rhetorical device of paradox is not intended to confound the reader. Its purpose is rather to awaken the reader from his or her simplistic and fallacious assumptions and comfortable delusions of familiarity. To enlighten entails the painful removal of erroneous presuppositions. This cure hurts even more when such fallacies are perpetuated through valued traditions of the masses. Due to Unamuno's quixotic courage to challenge received dogma, in conjunction with his literary creativity, he creates belief in whichever of his readers dares to risk social stigma. Unamuno's embrace of a partly Hegelian reasoning process is in iconoclastic defiance of the received traditionalism whose mass power marginalizes Unamunian thought.

Paz en la guerra shows Hegel's influence on Unamuno's way of thinking. Virtually all of the latter's paradoxical passages are suited to illustrate the former's Triadic Dialectic. Hegel's influence over Unamuno's thought is further exemplified by the latter's use of chiasmus, an element associated with paradox. A definition of chiasmus sheds even more light upon the perception of paradox.

The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language defines chiasmus as "a rhetorical inversion of the second of two parallel structures, as 'He went to the theater, but home went she'" (232). Olson discusses the use of chiasmus by Hegel and Unamuno, how

they are connected, and the relationship of chiasmus with paradox. Olson says about Unamuno, ". . . he learned enough German to read G.W.F. Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik . . ." (4). Olson reports on Unamuno having said that Hegel "'ha sido uno de los pensadores que más honda huella han dejado en mí. Hoy mismo creo que el fondo de mi pensamiento es hegeliano . . .'" (4).

Olson also observes Unamuno's appropriation of Hegel's idea of simultaneous antonymy and synonymy of existence and nonexistence, a paradox that is widely represented throughout Unamuno's Paz en la guerra:

> . . . the idea of the identity of pure being and pure nothingness is actually not one that he *took* from Hegel, so much as one to which he responded because it gave expression to his tendency to think in terms of paradoxically joined contraries. Hegel's concept, like all statements of identity, is itself based upon an implicit chiasmus, since because of the free reversibility of terms, the proposition *Being* = *Nothing* immediately evokes the corollary *Nothing* = *Being*, which shows them to be as implicitly symmetrical, and therefore chiastic, as are paired statements of equivalence. (4)

Palmer applies the above principle to Hegel's Triadic Dialectic, with which Being is the Thesis, Nothingness is the Antithesis, and Becoming is the Synthesis. Palmer says that anything occurring between the polarities of Being and Nothingness is Becoming (227). These texts imply that whatever is, is on its way to becoming something else. Not only are entities defined by everything that they are not, but they also move toward becoming something else that is defining them. Unamuno's words suggest, for example, that peace and war define each other, and each progresses toward becoming the other, even to the point of each simultaneously being the other. Unamuno further exemplifies this concept by implying the unification and instantaneity of past, present, and future. This is a rationale that supports his paradox of the identicalness of life and death:

> Paz canta el mar; paz dice calladamente la tierra; paz vierte el cielo; paz brota de las luchas por la vida, suprema armonía de las disonancias; paz en la guerra misma y

> bajo la guerra inacabable, sustentándola y coronándola. Es la guerra a la paz lo que a la eternidad el tiempo: su forma pasajera. Y en la Paz parecen identificarse la Muerte y la Vida. (Obras completas 2 300)

The above text implies that the capacity of human emotions to experience even the most extreme horrors of war cannot prevail without the interruption of the (at least temporary) sensation of peace. Either through the desensitization or the monotony of incessant mental anguish and physical trauma, the numbing effect of such monotony that tempers extremes invariably brings about a feeling of peace. Likewise, the sweetness of unlimited peace goads the dormant passions to clamor for calamity, if only to implore the subject to do something -- anything -- even if it is wrong.

The agonistic constituent of Unamuno's Socratic and quixotic nature is a major source of his creativity in the paradoxical mode. The text of his Paz en la guerra, along with virtually all of his literary output, says that peace embarrasses him while he is trying to maintain his devout belief in the need to suffer and struggle. Because Unamuno's nature is pivoted around this belief in the need to struggle, based on what his words imply, his greatest struggle is with the fear of losing or even somehow compromising this belief. He creates this belief, and with it, existentially creates his nature. Regarding the last sentence of the previous quote, the implication is not that life and death are two sides of the same metaphorical coin. Rather, they are only an infinitessimal atom on one side of said coin. Thus both sides are virtually a blank representation of the two faces of nothingness, of which the singular life/death entity struggles to become a part. So implies Unamuno's text.

The blurred synonymity of life and death meanders down the Heraclitian stream of Unamunian consciousness. With this attitude, Unamuno closes Paz en la guerra showing Hegelian paradox and the concept of *intrahistoria* that derives from Hegel, as

Blanco Aguinaga notes: " . . . ya está claro el concepto de la que Unamuno llamaría la 'intrahistoria': historia *natural* hegeliana . . . " (57). Within Hegel's sense of history, Unamuno sanctifies war if it leads to truth. Unamunian paradox transcends distinctions between life and death, faith and doubt, truth and falsity, and peace and war. Filtered through an understanding of Unamuno's sense of paradox, these final words of Paz en la guerra are equally applicable to peace as they are to war:

> En el seno de la paz verdadera y honda es donde sólo se comprende y justifica la guerra; es donde se hacen sagrados votos de guerrear por la verdad, único consuelo eterno; es donde se propone reducir a santo trabajo la guerra. No fuera de ésta, sino dentro de ella, en su seno mismo, hay que buscar la paz; paz en la guerra misma. (Obras completas 2 301)

The foregoing paradoxical ending of Unamuno's Paz en la guerra suggests that the appreciation of peace requires the contrast of war. Only by knowing pain can one know its absence. Within the Hegelian Triadic Dialectic, Unamuno's words imply that the Synthesis for the polarities of peace and war is his desired immortality of experience, consciousness, and identity.

The following chapter, "Chapter 3: Paradox in Unamuno's Niebla (1914)", illuminates the paradox inherent in the line that is supposed to separate fiction from reality. This line is paradoxical because Unamuno's words make it seem simultaneously existent and nonexistent. The paradox becomes sharply focused with one's concentrated exploration of this line of demarcation, as Unamuno's Niebla clearly exemplifies his literary technique of paradox.

CHAPTER 3
PARADOX IN UNAMUNO'S NIEBLA (1914)

Unamuno's Niebla is a work of metafiction. Webster's New World College Dictionary defines metafiction as follows:

> 1 Fiction in which the mediating function of the author and the technical methods used in writing are self-consciously emphasized and in which the traditional concern with verisimilitude is minimized. 2 A work of such fiction. (904)

Metafiction is paradoxical because it places the reader's mind in a position whereby that which he or she believes contradicts itself. To cite a strong example of metafiction may serve more effectively than to offer a longer and more detailed definition of this genre. Niebla is such an example because of how the author Unamuno creates the fictional Unamuno.

The real Unamuno situates his alter ego and namesake in the fiction so as to interact with the fictional characters. In effect, the author Unamuno, who is real, creates a fictional image of himself in order to interact with his characters who do not exist in reality and therefore cannot interact with the real Unamuno who writes them. It is this separation between the real and fictional Unamuno that is the line of demarcation between reality and fiction. Consequently, every aspect of the metafictional Niebla depends on the degree of the frailty of the reader's consciousness of the frontier separating actual fact from fictitious fantasy. It is in this way that the reader, consciously or not, submits to Unamuno's rhetorical paradoxical manipulations.

Before engaging a work of metafiction such as Niebla, the reader assumes that he or she knows what not to believe. The reader expects an absolute and fixed line of demarcation

between reality and illusion, fact and fiction, and what is true or false. Unamuno's words imply his intent to diminish such expectations. His texts suggest his aim to be the Socratic gadfly.

With Niebla, Unamuno plays with the reader's perception of the line that is supposed to separate the real from the fictitious. The reader begins to doubt the existence of knowledge, communication, and existence itself. This doubt enables the reader to more easily accept the metafiction that increasingly strengthens the doubt in the reader.

Unamuno's rhetorical use of irony and paradox in his metafiction Niebla entices the reader to assume and accept, on some level of consciousness, a synonymity of fact and fiction. The disbelief of the reader becomes suspended to some degree and for some length of time, depending on the mind of the individual reader. This device expands the horizons of the reader's consciousness. This expansion is a tool that one may apply in dealing with practical mundane situations. Unamuno's capacity to write a work such as Niebla exemplifies the use of expanded consciousness, strength of will, and developed literary acumen. His words imply that he uses them (consciousness, will, acumen, and words) as tools not only to express himself and teach his audience, but also to deal with his inner conflicts.

Even before the beginning of Niebla itself, Unamuno makes one of his fictional characters write the prologue. The reader's continuous reassurance that a fictional character cannot write a prologue, nor do anything else, demands a heightened focus on the part of the reader. This intensity of concentration is paradoxically enough to distract the reader from the text. Thus the reader is torn between the words of the novel and the conscience that impels him or her to resist the psychological enticement of Unamuno's metafiction.

Some of the prankish prose that constitutes Unamuno's Niebla suggests his sense of an almost vengeful triumph over an audience whose appreciation Unamuno demands and gets, based on what his words imply. The text makes the reader question truth, certainty, reality, and conclusion. While Unamuno creates his characters in Niebla, his imagination lets him suspend his disbelief that an author can be manipulated by his characters. The same creative imagination that enables Unamuno to write Niebla is that which makes him believe that he empowers his characters to affect him. This interaction may promptly embrace the thought mechanisms of the reader. For example, the text says:

> Es muy frecuente que un autor acabe por ser juguete de sus ficciones... "Y esta mi vida, ¿es novela, es nivola o qué es? Todo esto que me pasa y que les pasa a los que me rodean, ¿es realidad o es ficción? "No es acaso todo esto un sueño de Dios o de quien sea, que se desvanecerá en cuanto El despierte, y por eso le rezamos y elevamos a El cánticos e himnos, para adormecerle, para acunar su sueño? ¿No es acaso la liturgia toda de todas las religiones un modo de brezar el sueño de Dios y que no despierte y deje de soñarnos? ..." (Obras completas 2 616)

Unamuno's metafictional style suggests that he creates perplexed characters as a means to deal with his personal relationship with the mysteries of existence. Even a pragmatic reader not given to flights of fantasy may need to struggle to resist the seductive paradoxical line that supposedly separates reality from fiction.

Unamuno creates the belief, or "makes believe" that the prologue to his metafiction Niebla is written by a fictional character of the work, Víctor Goti. The reader knows the true writer to be Unamuno, but in question is the definition of the verb "to know." Unamuno forces a temporary suspension of the reader's habitual disbelief, and this suspension consequently compromises the authenticity of knowledge, communication, and existence itself.

The foregoing is implied by Unamuno's words in the prologue of his Niebla. He makes his character Víctor Goti "write" the prologue and "explain" why he is writing it:

> . . . porque los deseos del señor Unamuno son para mí mandatos, en la más genuina acepción de este vocablo. Sin haber yo llegado al extremo de escepticismo hamletiano de mi pobre amigo Pérez, que llegó hasta a dudar de su propia existencia, estoy por lo menos firmemente persuadido de que carezco de eso que los psicólogos llaman libre albedrío, aunque para mi consuelo creo también que tampoco goza don Miguel de él. (Obras completas 2 543)

Goti says that Pérez doubts his own existence. From the metafictional view, the *cogito* has Pérez knowing he exists since he thinks. From the concrete perspective, Pérez cannot think because he does not exist. It is the real person Unamuno who is doing the thinking for Pérez, and Unamuno is writing these thoughts while making it appear that his fictional protagonist Pérez is thinking. Unamuno also makes Pérez suspect this truth, but Pérez exists only for the sake of Unamuno's paradoxical rhetoric.

Nonexistent Pérez is in no position to think, suspect, or do anything else. Paradoxically, he is also in no position to be nonexistent, because even nonexistence implies the idea of existence. To think thus may help the reader see how Unamuno can manipulate the belief/disbelief systems of his audience. Upon entering Unamuno's realm, the reader becomes susceptible to a kind of understanding that the beauty of Unamuno's self-contradiction and paradox engender. This rhetorical device leads the reader to a level of consciousness that nonparadoxical literature cannot reach.

Goti exemplifies the foregoing. He is just as nonexistent as Pérez, and he implies as much by saying that he has no free will. He takes comfort in believing that Unamuno is also devoid of free will. Nonetheless, Unamuno exercises his power to choose whatever Goti says and does by virtue of the real Unamuno writing the fictional nonexistent Goti. The latter says that the former has no free will because it is the former who is making the latter say it. Unamuno's words thus imply, by backward extension, that his choice of

words is his deity's choice, and that this idea is projected through choices of his characters in Niebla.

What is at play here is the paradox of fatalistic predeterminism as opposed to existential free will. The paradox is that one is predetermined through destiny, environment, and biology to have the "free will" to choose one's destiny, environment, and even biology. Unamuno's spiral of "God-writer-character-reader" also provides a circular dynamic realm accommodating the reader's indulgence in paradoxical thinking.

It is the open-ended nonconclusiveness of that which has neither beginning nor end that is the circularity within which paradox best thrives. The circular interactions within Niebla require that the reader keep in mind that there are two distinct entities named Unamuno. The first is the real-life author who creates the second, his fictional persona, through which he may deal with the other characters in the novel. This second is the intermediary, for it is physically impossible for the real Unamuno to communicate directly with his metafictional characters. Unamuno's words suggest his idea that if an author can choose what his fictitious character may think, say, or do, within the context of the character's delusion of his free will, then, by extension, the author is in like position in relationship to his deity. The text of Niebla suggests that its author's link to its characters is a metaphor for God's link to the author.

Unamuno's words make his characters seem real. His text implies that God's creatures are real because they exist, while God is on a higher level of reality, and "super-exists." For Unamuno, reality can be only relative. His words suggest that some things exist more or less than others, and he uses his paradoxical metafiction Niebla to express this idea, as the text implies. The relativity of reality that the words of Niebla suggest is what engenders the paradox of this metafiction. Thus when Unamuno

contradicts himself and uses paradox, he is trying to justify his belief that reality can be only relative. The words of Niebla imply that reality and objectivity depend on one's perceptions; no two moments of which can be identical, even within one individual reading the text. Niebla compromises the absoluteness of communication, knowledge, and existence itself.

It is Unamuno's questioning of these components of nihilism that fuels his use of paradox in Niebla. As a novelist, Unamuno is asking the reader to imagine given possible situations and characters. The writer acknowledges the nonexistence of these fictional situations and characters despite the similarity between them and their counterparts in the real world. The exception lies with fantastic fiction because this genre cannot cohere with reality. Niebla is not supposed to be of this genre, but paradoxically consistent with his customary inconsistency, Unamuno injects an element of fantasy into Niebla. He makes the dog soliloquize on humanity's link with language: "La lengua le sirve para mentir, inventar lo que no hay y confundirse. . . . El lenguaje le ha hecho hipócrita" (Obras completas 2 680).

The foregoing shows Unamuno's departure from the metafiction that Niebla is supposed to exemplify. The "fact" that the dog thinks deeply (as may happen in fantastic fiction) has no direct link to the author through his persona talking with his protagonist (metafiction). Nonetheless, both modalities can equally represent real-world possibilities because the power of mythological symbolism transcends the hierarchical order of an imaginary spectrum that codifies degrees of reality and nonreality. The validity or authenticity of a moral or message is not dependent on whether such moral or message comes from a fiction that is fantastic or realistic, or a news report of a real event.

There is the reality of reason and mathematics and there is the reality of mythological ideas based on instinctive emotions including the faith to which Unamuno leaps. His Niebla with its metafictional paradox may spur the reader to further explore, through a greater sense of skepticism, the essence of reality. This essence varies with a given observer at a given moment. Because this makes reality relative, it challenges the possibility of defining reality as an absolute entity. By showing what reality is not, Niebla paradoxically offers a deeper understanding of the relativity of reality. This may be more effective than a factual definition.

Dictionaries try to define reality with words such as "objectivity" and "actuality." Because these abstract entities are perceived only through the subjective mind of a given individual, objectivity and actuality cannot exist beyond the limitations of their respective contexts. This linguistic problem of the inability to define reality leads to the paradox that the only reality is the fact that it cannot exist. Unamuno's words imply that he is relating to this paradox in Niebla, as he presents a dialogue between the fictitious character Pérez and the fictitious Unamuno whom the real Unamuno invents as his persona in the metafiction.

It is only through the fictitious copy of the real author that the latter is able to reach the metafictional world of the characters in Niebla. By way of analyzing what Unamuno's "dream dialogue" in Niebla implies, one may hypothesize that this text is one of Unamuno's effective ways of enabling the reader to see "reality" through the paradox of metafiction.

One of the parallels between metafiction and dream is that the author of the former creates a fictitious persona of the self so as to interact with the characters of the

metafiction. This compares to the subconscious mind of the dreamer that makes the fictitious persona of the self so as to interact with the characters and situations within the dream. The persona in the dream cannot be the same entity as the real dreamer who is having the dream. Thus the real dreamer cannot know that he or she is only dreaming. If the dreamer thinks that he or she knows that the experience at hand is only a dream, it is just because he or she is only dreaming that he or she knows this. Moreover, it is the subconsciously invented persona of the dreamer that believes that he or she knows that what is happening is just a dream. Only when awake can the dreamer know that what happened was a dream, because the unconsciousness of sleeping precludes knowing. Thus within a dream, one can only dream of knowing that the experience is a dream. The foregoing hypothetical analysis is parallel to what Unamuno depicts in his metafictional Niebla, which also contains a discussion on dreams (Obras completas 2 667).

If a particular belief, attitude, or emotion prevails in both the dream and the waking states, the difference between these states is partially compromised. This exemplifies the blurring of the line between fact and fiction. This negates any absolute separation of real and unreal. Based on the idea that one deals with real conflicts through dreaming, the text of Unamuno's metafiction implies the author's use of the dream process by extending and expanding upon it by writing Niebla. In so doing, Unamuno extends the blurring of the line between fantasy and reality to his metafiction while paradoxically reinforcing the authenticity of the line by dint of his intensely concentrated awareness of the line. The average "sane" person is supposed to know illusion from reality without inclining to concentrate upon the difference. In Unamuno's case, it would logically follow that his

heightened consciousness of the line would deem him more "sane" than the norm. Paradoxically, the more "sanely" that Unamuno dwells upon this line of demarcation between the dream state and the waking state, the more the authenticity of the line becomes compromised. The following words in Niebla suggest Unamuno's exploration into the world of dreams. His discussion on dreaming within the metafiction reflects his idea of the latter as extension of the former:

> -...Cuando un hombre dormido e inerte en la cama sueña algo, ¿qué es lo que más existe, él como conciencia que sueña, o su sueño?
>
> -¿Y si sueña que existe él mismo, el soñador? –le repliqué a mi vez.
>
> -En ese caso, amigo don Miguel, le pregunto yo a mi vez, ¿de qué manera existe él, como soñador que sueña, o como soñado por sí mismo? Y fíjese, además, en que al admitir esta discusión conmigo me reconoce ya existencia independiente de sí.
>
> -¡No, eso no! ¡Eso no! -le dije vivamente-. Yo necesito discutir, sin discusión no vivo y sin contradicción, y cuando no hay fuera de mí quien me discuta y contradiga, invento dentro de mí quien lo haga. Mis monólogos son diálogos.
>
> -Y acaso los diálogos que usted forje no sean más que monólogos...
>
> -Puede ser. Pero te digo y repito que tú no existes fuera de mí...
>
> -Y yo vuelvo a insinuarle a usted la idea de que es usted el que no existe fuera de mí y de los demás personajes a quienes usted cree haber inventado.
>
> (Obras completas 2 667)

The above excerpt from the text of Niebla suggests that Unamuno reinforces his belief in the deity/author/character/ reader relationships by his creation of a fictitious character with whom to share a dialogue that in reality is a monologue. Unamuno makes himself believe that he can create a belief in the fact that he can create a belief. The infinite circularity of this observation is paradoxical for its conclusion that it cannot conclude.

The same foregoing excerpt shows many other paradoxes. It begins with a question about one thing more truly existing than another. "Más existe" implies that existence is not "existence" in the strict sense of the word because it is relative. Unamuno's words imply that some things exist more than others. Niebla suggests that existence is relative rather than absolute. The text also implies the mutual and simultaneous creating and believing of deity, author, persona, character, and reader. The words of Unamuno suggest linear streams of consciousness as spinning into circularities of orbits. From this perspective, fact and fiction are not separated by lines of dogma. Rather, their polarities are harmonized by circles of paradox.

Notwithstanding, fact exists and fiction exists. The line that separates them exists. These concrete facts are real, actual, objective, and true. They invalidate Unamuno's idea that one entity can exist more than another, as his phrase "más existe" implies. Nevertheless, these truths cannot be absolute because they are not independent. They depend on the individual who is beholding and observing them, at a given moment. The line that separates fact from fiction depends on the intensity of the observer's focus on the line, at the time. The degree of this intensity that the reader brings to a work of metafiction, such as Niebla, strongly determines the reader's appreciation of the importance of paradox. This is because, with the line that separates fact from fiction, it is the fact or fiction of the line itself that must be questioned in a dialectical process. Unamuno's adherence to Hegel's Triadic Dialectic subjects the thetical fact of the line to be challenged by the antithetical fiction of it. The synthesis cannot exist because it is automatically a new thesis. Unamuno would reject a synthesis if it in fact were to exist because he denies conclusiveness. Thus the reader gains understanding by struggling with

the question, realizing that the answer is neither possible nor necessary. Niebla is about the line that separates reality from non-reality, and the reader's intensity of concentration upon the line determines both the existence and the nonexistence of the line. This is an effect, intended or not, of Unamuno's use of paradox, and it is a cause for the perpetuation of such use.

Intensity of concentration needs purpose, motivation, and the emotions that engender them, none of which can be treated by "exact science." This fact compromises the absoluteness of reality. If one adds to this the arbitrariness of language, one may say that "fiction exists," but one must first explore and examine the detailed definitions of "fiction," "existence," and "definition." Thus Unamuno's idea, valid or not, that one thing can exist more than another implies the relativity of all existence, even that of fiction.

At issue is the overlapping of fact and fiction. The words of metafictional Niebla suggest the blurring of the line that is supposed to separate real fact from the illusion of fiction. The principles of contradiction and the harmonizing of polarities define the paradoxes that Unamuno's words reflect in his Niebla. His text also suggests his expectation that his readers wonder about various reasons for his use of paradox.

Does Unamuno use paradox as a means of self-deprecation, so as to relieve the seriousness of his existence? Unamuno's words keep showing his pride in being contradictory. His playful phrase "más existe" is a clear example of both his pride and his humility. He is humble enough to admit to being proud of his paradoxical intentionality. "Más existe" implies that some entities exist more than others. This means that some things can exist to such a lesser degree that they lose their identity as being existent. The absoluteness of existence demands that a thing either must be or must not be. "Más

existe" makes existence relative rather than absolute. This idea negates all existence, even though Unamuno, his words, and his mind that interacts with his words exist while his words "más existe" imply the impossibility of any existence.

Thus Unamuno makes his existence more tolerable by "denying" the existence of anything, including himself. This Unamunian "comic relief" and sense of paradoxical humor are well reflected in his metafictional Niebla with its compromised line that is supposed to separate fact from fiction.

Such a line exists, but the existence of the fact that one thing can exist more than another invalidates the concept of existence, because of the uncertainty of how far a thing must be reduced before it ceases to exist. The question is not only the existence of a line that is supposed to separate fact from fiction, but also the existence of a line that is supposed to separate existence from nonexistence.

To further compound Unamuno's "más existe" paradox, the concept of the relativity of existence absolutely recognizes the existence of a given existence. Unamuno's phrase "más existe" implies the necessary equal validity of "menos existe," and how little a thing can exist before it can be called "nonexistent," by whom, and under what conditions.

Thus the line that is supposed to separate fact from fiction does or does not exist, to varying degrees. This casts existence and nonexistence as synonymous, or at least, as two sides of the same coin. In this case, the coin would represent consciousness and/or a linguistic construct. Unamuno's dialogue with the protagonist of Niebla suggests the hypothetical synonymity of existence and nonexistence by dint of a spectrum of relativity:

-¿Cómo que no existo? -exclamó.

> -No, no existes más que como ente de ficción; no eres, pobre Augusto, más que un producto de mi fantasía y de las de aquellos de mis lectores que lean el relato que de tus fingidas venturas y malandanzas he escrito yo; tú no eres más que un personaje de novela, o de *nivola*, o como quieras llamarle. (Obras completas 2 666)

The words of the fictional Unamuno in Niebla verify that he knows that Augusto, with whom he is conversing, is a fictional character. What the fictional Unamuno does not seem to realize is that he is just as fictional as Augusto. The real author Unamuno intentionally uses this device of playful enigma.

Extreme ambiguity results from the following circumstances: Unamuno's fictional persona believes himself to be real. Fictitious Augusto also believes that he is real. Each believes that only the other is fictional. The reader of the fiction is real, and the onus is upon him or her to sharply focus on the important distinctions. The dialogue is tricky because it challenges the reader to stay fully conscious of the fact that the real author Unamuno and his fictional persona Unamuno are two different entities. The sharply focused realization of this distinction must never be compromised.

It is impossible for the real Unamuno to engage a dialogue with a fictional and nonexistent character. As a substitute, he invents a fictional persona to represent him. Material for a much deeper philosophical study would be the essence of the unfathomable lacuna that separates the real author from his fictional persona. Unamuno's text implies that its dialogue is that which would satisfy Unamuno were it real and not part of a fiction. Unamuno's words suggest that such a dialogue would be ideal for him, were all of the circumstances in the novel actual fact. The words in his Niebla imply his intent to show the importance of self-contradiction and paradox.

When Unamuno says, "...sin discusión no vivo y sin contradicción..." (Obras completas 2 667), he contradicts himself, because he is making a noncontradictory

statement. In his dialogue, Unamuno avers, "Dudas, no -le interrumpí-; certeza absoluta de que tú no existes fuera de mi producción novelesca" (Obras completas 2 666). This statement negates any doubt. Unamuno is contradicting the fact that he needs doubt and contradiction. In so doing, he is indulging the contradiction and the paradox that he needs.

In Unamuno's Niebla, his dialogues with his fictional protagonist Augusto reflect momentary suspended disbelief during the acts of writing and reading it. The paradoxical nature of self-contradiction of one's belief is akin to the mixed emotions induced by horror fiction. The reader feels terrified, but safe in knowing that it is but fiction. The fictional persona Unamuno and the fictional protagonist Augusto are upset by their mutual threats to kill, while each denies the other's existence. Paradoxically, this mutual denial does not mitigate the anxiety. Unamuno's belief in his deity further complicates the issue, while paradoxically shedding some light of reason upon it. The protagonist of Unamuno's Niebla begs Unamuno's fictional persona to let him stay alive to keep his identity:

> -Quiero vivir, vivir..., y ser yo, yo, yo...
>
> -Pero si tú no eres sino lo que yo quiera...
>
> -¡Quiero ser yo, ser yo! ¡Quiero vivir!
>
> -y le lloraba la voz. (Obras completas 2 669)

The contradictory and paradoxical synonymity of existence and nonexistence, although hypothetical, shows itself when the real Unamuno, by way of the fictional persona Unamuno, refuses Augusto his continued existence/nonexistence:

> -Lo tengo ya escrito y es irrevocable; no puedes vivir más. . . Dios, cuando no sabe qué hacer de nosotros, nos mata. . . Y me temo que, en efecto, si no te mato pronto, acabes por matarme tú. . . Está escrito y no puedo volverme atrás. Te morirás.
>
> -Pero... por Dios...

> -No hay pero ni Dios que valgan. ¡Vete!
>
> -Pues bien, mi señor creador don Miguel, también usted se morirá, . . . ¡Dios dejará de soñarle! . . . y se morirán todos los que lean mi historia . . . ¡Entes de ficción como yo; lo mismo que yo! . . . yo . . . ente ficticio como vosotros . . . El que crea se crea y el que se crea se muere . . . y morirán todos los que me piensen . . .
>
> Luego se tanteó como si dudase ya de su propia existencia. (Obras completas 2 670)

The foregoing excerpts from the dialogue between the fictional persona Unamuno and the fictional protagonist in Niebla reflect the author's use of paradox as the central rhetorical device in his literature. The most prominent aspect of this use is Unamuno's manipulation of the belief systems of his readers. He effects a suspension of the reader's disbelief, if only for the duration of the reading. His purpose is to encourage understanding by fostering doubt, inquiry, and analysis of the line that is supposed to separate fiction from reality. Unamuno vivifies paradox by blurring the line between existence and nonexistence, so that his readers may perceive the two as one and the same entity. The traditional disbelief of this hypothesis becomes suspended, however temporary. This harmonization of opposites, such as existence and nonexistence, reality and fantasy, and fact and fiction, is a major constituent of paradox.

Unamuno's words imply his intent to make his reader embrace paradox. Part of his technique is allowing the harmonization of opposites to subtly intrude upon the reader's habitual adherence to the limiting shallowness that conventional dogma impels. Unamuno's words imply the pitfalls of blind conformity. The possibility of a fictional character communicating with the author of the fiction is the opposite of the impossibility of this idea. Unamuno harmonizes these opposites with his Niebla by making his fictional persona and the fictional protagonist threaten to kill each other. Unamuno's style of writing the dialogue between these adversaries entices the reader to lose focus on the

distinction between the real Unamuno and the fictitious persona. The gap between the two distracts the reader, however briefly, from concentrating on this difference. The space that Unamuno provides between himself and his fictional persona, based on what the text of his metafiction implies, is the *terra incognita* that engenders the paradox of polarities that harmonize. This enables Unamuno to play with the line that separates fact from fiction by unifying them. Paradoxically, he does this within a context of extreme gravity, but he is serious about the line within a context of impish and prankful jollity. The manipulation of the line that is supposed to separate illusion from reality leads Unamuno to the rhetorical device of paradox with which he creates his metafictional Niebla.

Unamuno's act of writing metafiction is a reality that puts words together to signify an unreality. The product of his writing is not the act of his writing, even though factual act and fictional product both constitute writing. This equates writing with not writing, and shows the inauthenticity of language, consequently casting doubt upon the authenticity of any word, including "authenticity" itself. Unamuno plays with words. Author Unamuno playfully confuses himself with his persona. In the following dialogue of Niebla, he keeps the reader guessing which Unamuno is letting protagonist Pérez rail against him:

> . . . ¿Conoces a don Miguel de Unamuno, Domingo?
>
> -Sí, algo he leído de él en los papeles. Dicen que es un señor un poco raro que se dedica a decir verdades que no hacen al caso...
>
> -Pero ¿le conoces?
>
> -¿Yo?, ¿Para qué?
>
> -Pues también Unamuno es cosa de libros... Todos lo somos... ¡Y él se morirá, sí, se morirá, se morirá también, aunque no lo quiera..., se morirá! Y ésa será mi venganza. ¿No quiere dejarme vivir? ¡Pues se morirá, se morirá, se morirá! (Obras completas 2 675)

These words of Unamuno imply that the protagonist Pérez knows that he, as well as everything else in existence, is something out of a book. In the case of his particular "existence," he is obviously refering to the book Niebla, in which he is being written by Unamuno, whose name he mentions. He knows that the author has decided to kill him, and he takes consolation in the fact that the author will eventually meet his own demise.

A major paradox with metafiction is that it simultaneously appears to be both more and less unreal than regular fiction. Because the author is a real person, his involvement in the metafiction makes it seem less a fantasy than ordinary fiction. However, the author's interactions with the characters incline to draw enough of the reader's attention to the suspension of his or her disbelief, so that the reader concentrates more strongly upon the fact that the contents of the metafiction are nevertheless unreal. Thus the reader's added awareness of the unreality of the work may make it seem more illusory than conventional fiction. Analogically, one who repeatedly vaunts his or her integrity tends to arouse doubt and suspicion in those within earshot.

If repetitive emphasis persuades a reader that a given point is valid to a given degree, the inherent doubts that the point carries are just as convincing as the persuasion. This is one of the features that makes Unamuno's Niebla so paradoxical. For any split-second that a reader doubts the fictitiousness of the protagonist, the real and the unreal are fused as one entity. Unamuno seizes upon this dialectical mechanism as a device by which to suspend the disbelief of his readers, in this case, those of Niebla. He thus validates his use of paradox as a major rhetorical device in his works. It is the momentum of self-proliferating paradox that keeps alive and effective the ideas in Unamuno's literature. His paradox creates belief, not only by uniting fact

with fiction, but also by going beyond both, thereby compromising the difference between them.

Huertas-Jourda discusses Unamuno's use of paradox as being invaluable for its vigorous and compelling way of conveying reality. Huertas-Jourda says that Unamuno's use of paradox forces the reader to "experience the idea, rather than just receive it" (9). He also notes how the "'real' world and the world of 'fiction' lose their distinction . . . " (42). Unamuno's metafictional Niebla exemplifies this loss of distinction. To experience an idea makes it more concrete than to just receive the idea. This modifies the identity of the idea, such as that of the nonexistence of the fictitious protagonist of Niebla. The complex dynamics of the reader's belief system interacting with Unamuno's device of paradox blurs the line between fact and fiction into a nonconcluding malleable mist.

The misty ambience of Niebla reflects Unamuno's blurring of the line that is supposed to distinguish wife from mother. He projects this theme onto character Don Avito, during a dialogue with protagonist Augusto:

> . . . jamás creí al hacerla madre que como tal la necesitaría para mí un día. Porque yo no conocí a mi madre, Augusto, no la conocí; yo no he tenido madre, no he sabido qué es tenerla hasta que al perder mi mujer a mi hijo y suyo se ha sentido madre mía. (Obras completas 2 600)

This oedipal Unamunian theme is paradoxical because it reflects the lust for procreation as simultaneous with its opposite, the desire for self-negation, or the death wish. The latter is represented by the urge to return to the umbilical and prenatal states. The interchangeability of wife and mother, in this case, serves as metaphor for the paradox of simultaneous creation and destruction. Abellán says, "Unamuno veía a la mujer exclusivamente bajo la forma de madre" (44). Abellán also quotes Unamuno as having

said that, "La mujer es, ante todo y sobre todo, madre. El instinto de la maternidad es en ella mucho más fuerte que el de la sexualidad..." (45).

Unamuno further expresses words in Niebla that suggest the paradox of simultaneously seeking and escaping from the propagation of the species. This idea is included in the general meaning of this quote describing the opposing currents of paradox:

> "Por debajo de esta corriente de nuestra existencia, por dentro de ella, hay otra corriente en sentido contrario; aquí vamos del ayer al mañana, allí se va del mañana al ayer. Se teje y se desteje a un tiempo. Y de vez en cuando nos llegan hálitos, vahos y hasta rumores misteriosos de ese otro mundo, de ese interior de nuestro mundo. Las entrañas de la historia con una contrahistoria, es un proceso inverso al que ella sigue. El río subterráneo va del mar a la fuente. (Obras completas 2 578)

The foregoing words of Unamuno in his Niebla suggest his skillful fluency with paradox. These words not only imply the paradoxical stream of his consciousness, but also the easy flow of his expression of this way of thinking. Metaphors such as "opposite flowing currents" and "subterranean rivers" constitute part of Unamuno's rhetorical device by which he sweeps the mind of the reader into the currents of paradoxical thought whose constant changing keeps challenging dogma.

As his words imply, Unamuno uses paradox in order to authenticate it, and this authentication validates his use of paradox. The dogmatic and monodimensional absoluteness of literal interpretation, when compared with its opposing paradoxical mode, shows the latter to prevail. Unamuno's words suggest that paradox, because of its fluid and vibrant dynamism, prevails over staid and unyielding dogma . The literary imagination of a given author outlives the latter through his or her works. The fictional characters never lived, but the author did. An example is Don Quixote, who long outlives the physical body of his author Cervantes. One may wonder who of the two is more real. The principles, messages, and concepts involved with the fictional Manchego

transcend historical limits, whereas the real life span of his author is confined to a relatively brief period in history.

Yet it is Cervantes and not Don Quixote who existed in reality. In Niebla, Unamuno questions this "reality," making his protagonist Augusto ask Unamuno's persona in the fiction:

> -Bueno; pues no se incomode tanto si yo, a mi vez, dudo de la existencia de usted y no de la mía propia. Vamos a cuentas: ¿No ha sido usted el que, no una, sino varias veces, ha dicho que Don Quijote y Sancho son, no ya tan reales, sino más reales que Cervantes? (Obras completas 2 667)

The imagination and the consciousness of the reader to this day, many years after the end of Unamuno's earthly existence, revive and vivify Augusto Pérez and the other characters of Niebla with every moment of the reading. Yet Unamuno existed, while the fictitious characters never did. Documentation proving the existence and the works of Unamuno, as well as his effects in the Casa Museo of Unamuniana in Salamanca still exist. Nonetheless, they owe their significance to fictional characters, and only storytellers and ink marks on parchment bespeak the paradoxically unreal reality of the fictitious beings. Thus Niebla spurs the reader to question such matters as reality, existence, consciousness, and the paradoxical power of the word.

Unamuno's words suggest that paradox is the highest form of sincerity that can be mistaken for hypocrisy. As Abellán remarks, some well-intended but misled critics misinterpret Unamuno's paradox for hypocrisy and atheism (141-42). Abellán eventually refutes allegations of hypocrisy, and praises Unamuno's sincerity (147-48).

Reading Unamuno's literature should cultivate a sense for paradox necessary to understand him. The level of Unamuno's submission to his deity well transcends that of the traditional religiosity of the pragmatically powerful but less intellectual who

reflexively misinterpret him. Trapped within the limitations of superficial and erroneous appearances, Unamuno's decriers label him as atheist.

Regarding Unamuno's religiosity, or lack of it, Abellán offers many diverse ideas and opinions from a psychoanalytic perpective. He interprets Unamuno's spiritualism as it relates to myths, the image of the deity as "vengeful father" and/or "forgiving mother," and pantheistic mysticism (211-23). In reflecting some of these influences, the words of Niebla insinuate the paradoxical idea that one constantly changes while pursuing a constant and unchanging deity. Writing Niebla is one of Unamuno's ways of struggling with his faith and his doubt. It is the interchangeability of deity, author, fictional characters, and readers and their positions as hypothetical metaphors for each other that make Niebla important for an exploration of Unamuno's use of paradox.

The paradoxes of this metafiction serve as a technique with which Unamuno struggles with the doubts and faith of his unusual and iconoclastic spirituality. When Unamuno says that he cannot live without contradiction, a deep probing of his words reveal more than the fact that he means the opposite of what he says. If he is contradicting himself while he is saying that he cannot live without contradiction, he wants his audience to consider the fact that he can indeed live without contradiction. His use of ambiguity, inconsistency, self-contradiction, and paradox is not an intention to confuse. Rather, Unamuno means to free his audience from the yoke of enslaving dogmatic conclusiveness. This is what Unamuno's words imply.

The paradox of Niebla's metafiction presents a range of possibilities. Unamuno's words suggest that he is trying to prove only the fact that one should not try to prove anything. Unamuno's words insinuate that the goal is not to show that the characters in the novel are

more or less real than the author. The goal is to enrich the mind of the reader by presenting opposing possibilities. The consciousness so expanded may better control the emotional nostalgia that tends to resist the mind's adherence to the beauty of harmonized polarities.

The awakening to paradox unsettles the false familiarity of dogma to which the unaware reader may have clung. Unamuno's wording connotes the existence of truth as relative to the observer's experience of beauty. The reader's absorption of the value of opposing ideas presented together is one way by which Niebla quickens the mind to a sense of truth. Unamuno's wordage of self-contradiction hints of a reverbatory engendering of truth through the beauty of paradox. This is the paradox of all theses being compatible with the antitheses that challenge them. An example of this is the issue of the umbrella that the text of Niebla presents.

It would seem that the usefulness of the open umbrella reflects truth by virtue of its utilitarian practicality. The common poetic notion of truth and beauty emanating from each other would thereby make the open umbrella beautiful, while the closed umbrella would have less beauty for its relative uselessness. This hypothesis reflects the hidden paradox in character Augusto's soliloquy in Niebla:

> ¡Estaba tan elegante, tan esbelto, plegado y dentro de su funda! Un paraguas cerrado es tan elegante como es feo un paraguas abierto.
>
> "Es una desgracia esto de tener que servirse uno de las cosas - pensó Augusto -; tener que usarlas. El uso estropea y hasta destruye toda belleza. . . Aquí, en esta pobre vida, no nos cuidamos sino de servirnos de Dios; pretendemos abrirlo, como a un paraguas, para que nos proteja de toda suerte de males." (Obras completas 2 557)

The foregoing reflects the dichotomy between both the aesthetic and utilitarian kinds of beauty. The humanities that the former reflects and the sciences that the latter involves are both important. Based on what his character Augusto says about the umbrella, the foregoing quote reflects yet another way in which Unamuno uses paradox.

Although Unamuno is conscientious and intentional about his using paradox while he writes, his words imply that much of his use of it may be spontaneous rather than planned. One may detect this in his novels and his essays.

The following chapter, "Chapter 4: Paradox in Unamuno's Del sentimiento trágico de la vida (1913)", explores this essay for Unamuno's contradictory expression. Not only does the text suggest his intended ambiguities, but as in the preceding chapter, it also elicits potential interpretations of paradox of which Unamuno may have not been aware. One example would be Unamuno's thoughts on reality and unreality. The hypothetical relativity of each entity resuscitates paradoxes that are only indirectly linked to the sources from which Unamuno formulates his own paradoxical ideas.

CHAPTER 4
PARADOX IN UNAMUNO'S DEL SENTIMIENTO TRÁGICO DE LA VIDA (1913)

No author can know every potential interpretation of his or her words. Paradoxes that Unamuno did not consciously intend may appear to the reader. Such a case is suggested by the words in Unamuno's essay Del sentimiento trágico de la vida. From the outset of this work, his words imply his automatic paradoxical bent. He negates the absoluteness of words by making them relative, so that there is no absolute reality or existence. The extent of a thing being real is determined by how it compares to everything else.

When Unamuno says that " . . . lo real, lo realmente real, es irracional: que la razón construye sobre irracionalidades" (Del sentimiento trágico de la vida 24), his words suggest that some things can be real without being "really real." Because reality needs its absoluteness to sustain itself, making reality relative negates reality, dogma, and conclusion. Dogmatically, an entity is either real or unreal. Paradoxically, and for Unamuno, some things are more real than others. This makes everything simultaneously real and unreal. Although Unamuno contradicts Hegel by saying that reason is built upon irrationalities, Hegel's Dialectic lets them both self-oppose.

The paradox in the above case is that Unamuno's idea that he frames with the terminology "realmente real" negates realness as an absolute value. If an object or idea is real, the fact that it can be "really real" suggests that being merely "real" without the qualifier "really" diminishes the degree of its realness. Thus reality negates itself by virtue of its relativity. At issue is the point at which an entity is not "really real" enough to exist

within the realm of reality. This paradox closely relates to Unamuno's term "más existe," which implies that one thing can exist more than another, which eventually can "less" exist to the point of nonexistence.

In the same foregoing quote, Unamuno diametrically opposes Hegel. Unamuno's words "lo real, lo realmente real, es irracional: que la razón construye sobre irracionalidades" imply his determination to establish the meaning of the real and the rational with a strong and compound use of paradox. Unamuno's words suggest the reality and the rationality of the idea that neither reality nor rationality can exist. His words imply that he is authenticating the impossibility for anything to exist, including nonexistence itself.

With paradox, Unamuno's words insinuate his communication that negates communication, existence, and knowledge. His words "conocimiento inconciente" [sic] imply either that one can know without being aware of the fact, or that one can know during a state of unconsciousness. Unamuno does not distinguish between the two meanings, but whereas the former possibility is more viable, the latter is a self-contradictory and oxymoronic paradox. He says:

> Mas es menester distinguir aquí entre el deseo o apetito de conocer, aparentemente y a primera vista, por amor al conocimiento mismo, entre el ansia de probar del fruto del árbol de la ciencia, y la necesidad de conocer para vivir. Esto último, que nos da el conocimiento directo e inmediato, y que en cierto sentido, si no pareciese paradójico, podría llamarse conocimiento inconciente [sic], es común al hombre con los animales, mientras lo que nos distingue de éstos es el conocimiento reflexivo, el conocer del conocer mismo. (Del sentimiento trágico de la vida 38)

Unamuno's words imply his consciousness of the fact that one needs words in order to be conscious, not only of one's knowledge, but also of one's consciousness. Unamuno's words suggest that the arbitrariness of language and words betrays his desire for truth, so he looks to faith as a way to truth. His words imply that he can gain access to faith

without the use of words. This is paradoxical because he needs the words to know that he needs no words to gain access to faith.

Unamuno notes the alliance of doubt and despair that paradoxically forms the basis of faith that needs no words:

> . . . la incertidumbre que aliada a la desesperación, forma la base de la fe. "La fe - dicen algunos - es no pensar en ello; entregarse confiadamente a los brazos de Dios, los secretos de cuya providencia son inescudriñables." Sí; pero también la infidelidad es no pensar en ello. Esa fe absurda, esa fe sin sombra de incertidumbre, esa fe de estúpidos carboneros, se une a la incredulidad absurda, a la incredulidad sin sombra de incertidumbre, a la incredulidad de los intelectuales atacados de estupidez afectiva, para no pensar en ello. (Del sentimiento trágico de la vida 125)

Unamuno's words suggest that one needs words to experience doubt, but only the absence of words can precipitate the faith that springs from the doubt. The implication is that first there is language, or the word, which begets consciousness, which begets doubt. However, doubt can engender faith only when the doubter discards the language that caused the doubt. Words are the temporary scaffolds that consciousness and ensuing doubt require, and only upon removing the scaffolds of language, can the faith emerge.

The above paradoxical piecemeal process is instantaneous, in which case it paradoxically cannot be called a process. It is rather the "leap to faith," the Kierkegaardian concept that Unamuno sees as the union of doubt with despair from which faith springs. Also, he says, " . . . el hombre, por ser hombre, por tener conciencia, es ya, respecto al burro o a un cangrejo, un animal enfermo. La conciencia es una enfermedad" (Del sentimiento trágico de la vida 34).

Unamuno's words make no insinuation as to whether the germs of the disease are already contained within the words that beget consciousness, or whether the disease of consciousness arrives after the birth of said consciousness. Unamuno's words suggest that the disease of consciousness subsequently engenders the doubt and despair whose

alliance forms the basis of faith. In turn, faith annihilates the antecedents that create it. By this implication, language, consciousness, doubt, and despair constitute the formula for faith.

Unamuno's words imply that faith needs no words, but words are paradoxically needed to know this. His words suggest that the visceral essence of his faith that escapes reason and logic provides access to his deity that transcends the words of reason and the logic of language. His words suggest the impossibility of saying anything about the deity or any other word or name associated with the deity. The divinity of the deity is totally disconnected from language, even though Unamuno needs the connections of words to say this: " . . . Dios es indefinible. Querer definir a Dios es pretender limitarlo en nuestra mente, es decir, matarlo" (Del sentimiento trágico de la vida 163). While saying that God is indefinable, Unamuno is defining God. The paradox further intensifies as Unamuno's own words speak simultaneously of destroying and recreating a belief by means of paradox.

Regarding the creating or inventing of a belief in a deity, Unamuno shows further paradox. He first disdains a saying about the need to invent God if God did not exist:

> Y nada hemos de decir de aquella frase abyecta e innoble de "si no hubiera Dios habría que inventarlo". Esta es la expresión del inmundo escepticismo de los conservadores, de los que estiman que la religión es un resorte de gobierno, y cuyo interés es que haya en la otra vida infierno para los que aquí se oponen a sus intereses mundanos. (Del sentimiento trágico de la vida 126)

The first paradox in this quote is that Unamuno is saying that nothing should be said about what he is saying. He expresses a second paradox regarding this quote when he later discusses two different kinds of faith. Unamuno quotes Kierkegaard's supposition of a man who insincerely believes in the "true deity," as opposed to the man who, with

passionate sincerity, has faith in an idol. Unamuno's words imply validation of the latter case:

> "Si de dos hombres - dice Kierkegaard - reza el uno al verdadero Dios con insinceridad personal, y el otro con la pasión toda de la infinitud reza a un ídolo, es el primero el que en realidad ora a un ídolo, mientras que el segundo ora en verdad a Dios." Mejor es decir que es Dios verdadero Aquel a quien se reza y se anhela de verdad. Y hasta la superstición misma puede ser más reveladora que la teología. (Del sentimiento trágico de la vida 171-72)

These words of Unamuno imply his belief that what matters more is one's faith in a deity, rather than whether or not the deity really exists. This belief of Unamuno contradicts the previous scorn that he expresses against the idea that the nonexistence of a deity would necessitate the invention of one. Unamuno's words imply that the object of one's faith is far less important than the faith itself. In so stating, he suggests his approval of creating to believe, or inventing a deity existent or not. Unamuno's words suggest not only his own self-contradictions, but he also cites paradoxical words of others, such as Miguel de Molinos:

> " . . . el alma que así se sabe solamente despegar es la que se llega a perder en Dios, y sólo la que así se llega a perder es la que se acierta a hallar". Muy español Molinos, sí, y no menos española esta paradójica expresión de quietismo o más bien de nihilismo . . . (Del sentimiento trágico de la vida 206)

As usual, Unamuno's words imply his attitude that Spain has a monopoly on a universal detail, such as the paradoxical essence of existence and the human consciousness of existence. Although this impression may be the result of the theatrical manner in which writers in the Romance literatures, particularly Spanish, highlight paradox, it would seem that Unamuno's vast knowledge of literatures of other languages, such as English, German, Danish, and Russian would preclude his parochial assumption of paradox as an almost exclusive Iberian trait. This assumption of Unamuno presents a noteworthy paradox in itself, especially considering his familiarity with the paradoxicalness of the

Bible, whose multi-lingual development he compares with Don Quixote. He implies that the latter could effect a new cult.

In Del sentimiento trágico de la vida, Unamuno says:

> Y yo di un ¡muera Don Quijote!, y de esta blasfemia, que quería decir todo lo contrario que decía - así estábamos entonces -, brotó mi Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho y mi culto al quijotismo como religión nacional. (278)

The fictional Don Quixote, habitually adored by Unamuno as a Christ-like icon, suddenly appears to be the target of his wrath. Unamuno is actually resuscitating what he venerates. He thus tries to show that all passion, if intense enough, makes no distinction between love and hate, adoration and denigration, or life and death. His visceral passion harmonizes all opposing emotions, so that the opposite of life is not death. For Unamuno, the opposite of the life/death entity is apathy. Only through the visceral passions can one act strongly enough to be alive, and the only true opposite of intense passion for anything is beyond apathy - it is the absence of consciousness. This relates to Unamuno's preference to consciously suffer an eternity of anguish and pain over unconscious oblivion and the loss of self-identity that oblivion entails. He connects passion with paradox. While Unamuno curses Don Quixote, he says that he is contradicting himself. This example of intense passion equalizing opposing emotions shows Unamuno's desire to keep Don Quixote alive, as opposed to those Cervantine scholars who relegate the fictional heroic knight to dead ink marks on parchment. In reference to his Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho, Unamuno's explanation reflects his antipathy for systematized logic:

> Escribí aquel libro para repensar el Quijote contra cervantistas y eruditos, para hacer obra de vida de lo que era y sigue siendo para los más letra muerta. ¿Qué me importa lo que Cervantes quiso o no quiso poner allí y lo que realmente puso? Lo vivo es lo que yo allí descubro, pusiéralo o no Cervantes, lo que yo allí pongo y sobrepongo y sotopongo, y lo que ponemos allí todos. Quise allí rastrear nuestra filosofía . . . española, está líquida y difusa en nuestra literatura, en nuestra vida, en nuestra acción, en nuestra mística, sobre todo, y no en sistemas filosóficos. Es

> concreta. ¿Y es que acaso no hay en Goethe, verbigracia, tanta o más filosofía que en Hegel? (Del sentimiento trágico de la vida 278-79)

Unamuno's above words suggest that Spanish philosophy is concrete for not being based on philosophical systems. It would seem that the reverse is more logical because systems make philosophy more concrete. In comparing the works of Goethe and Hegel, Unamuno fails to differentiate between two uses of philosophy. That of Goethe is more subtly intimated in the tone of his fictions, whereas Hegel's works more directly and concretely express philosophy with the rationale of Hegelian systems. Whether or not Unamuno deliberately misuses the term "concrete" as an excuse or base from which to wax paradoxical is moot. There is no way by which to guage the extent of how deliberate or accidental is his placing of words. Unamuno, Socratic gadfly that he is, succeeds in rousing his reader with unexpected and somewhat jarring declarations. He does this especially with self-contradiction and paradox. Nonetheless, he fails to explain what he says, and his words suggest his unawareness, not only of this particular failure, but also of the fact that his lack of explanation weakens the intended impact of his message. As an example, his lack of explaining why he curses Don Quixote deprives the reader of the enlightenment that Unamuno obviously wants to impart. He says only, " . . . de esta blasfemia, que quería decir todo lo contrario que decía . . . brotó . . . mi culto al quijotismo como religión nacional" (Del sentimiento trágico de la vida 278).

While at once cursing and blessing his hero, Unamuno shows that the visceral passions of emotion bypass logic and reason to the point of blurring the line between reverence and disdain. Unamuno's words also imply his resenting his inability to control his emotions, so he curses what he sees as triggering his vulnerability, even though he worships the very cause that so influences him. His conflict between emotion and logic

compounds the paradox, as his self-contradictory texts reflect the perpetual and paradoxically simultaneous solution of, and inability to resolve the conflict between faith and reason.

In the above case, as in many others, the circularity of Hegel's Triadic Dialectic allows Unamuno to "reach" a Synthesis that he "cannot" reach because of the Synthesis automatically becoming a new Thesis. Unamuno's words imply influence of Hegel, from whose paradoxical system Unamuno finds reasons why mindless passions are needed to at once curse and bless Don Quixote.

Thus, while cursing the fabled knight, Unamuno says that he means the exact opposite. Instead of restraining his emotions, he gives vent to them. He rails against the legendary icon that inspires his deepest adulation. Unamuno aims to convince his reader of the value of paradox, yet he does not explain why he so blatantly and boastfully contradicts himself. Based on what his words imply, he is not ambivalent about the fact that he needs ambivalence. "Fixing" the exact position of his thought that eludes being fixed, he stays inscrutable, and his antipathy for conclusion justifies his withholding explanations. His words suggest his aim to show the reader the values of paradox.

Unamuno challenges the reader to analyze the implications of his self-contradictory words. He thereby encourages the reader to overcome shallow-minded submission to conclusive dogma. The formidable and imposing demands of playful paradox replace the tyranny of received assumptions. As the consciousness evolves and expands, a philological process provides deeper understanding of how a word can have two opposite senses. To specify some examples, to sanction is to allow and to disallow, and to cleave is to connect and to separate. This shows a philological basis that enables words to

overcome the limitations of their definitions. From this perspective, one may better understand the paradox of Unamuno cursing what he most adores.

Because of the arbitrariness of language, dogmatic conclusions are more apt to tempt their antitheses. The concreteness of certainty is challenged by the abstractness of uncertainty. The randomness of evolving words fuses philology with paradox.

Unamuno's words imply his understanding that paradox and language exist in a perpetual process of mutual invention. His comments on philology suggest that there can be no paradox without words, and that there can be no words without paradox. While the random nature of language negates reason, it is language that creates reason. Unamuno says, "Toda filosofía es, pues, en el fondo, filología. Y la filología, con su grande y fecunda ley de las formaciones analógicas, da su parte al azar, a lo irracional, a lo absolutamente inconmensurable" (Del sentimiento trágico de la vida 280).

Unamuno's words imply that, even though reason depends on words, the randomness of words invalidates reason. Each idea is subject to the arbitrary whim of the language that contains the idea, including this idea that Unamuno expresses, even while he is expressing it. While paradox is negating preconceived assumptions of rationality, it is this same paradoxical process that establishes and concretizes rationality.

Although Unamuno admits to his being self-contradictory, his literature rarely shows that he analyzes or dissects his paradoxicalness. This could mean one or both of two things: he wants his readers to dissect his works as a useful process by which to learn paradox, or he is so enmeshed in paradox, that he is not always fully conscious of the extent to which paradox is ingrained in his thought. For example, Unamuno's words

honor the collectivity of ethnic identity, even as he paradoxically praises quasi-solipsistic individualism:

> "Y esto de que el individuo sea el fin del Universo lo sentimos muy bien nosotros los españoles" (Del sentimiento trágico de la vida 281).

The above words suggest the paradox of individual subjectivity as it relates to the collectivity of the people of a nation. Unamuno's words imply his aim to use paradox as a means to distract his readers and to awaken them by the distraction that may make them more receptive to the importance of paradox. Based on this Unamunian tactic, the following sheds light on his use of paradox and distraction as a means to mutually proliferate.

To reiterate, the last words of Del sentimiento trágico de la vida show Unamuno blessing his readers with glory at the expense of peace (295). Unamuno's words imply that peace is an illusion that distracts one from the reality that existence demands the struggle to overcome, and that one's best hope is for the glory of overcoming challenges. Moreover, each experience of glory only prepares one to meet the next inevitable challenge. Unamuno aims to distract his readers by denying them peace, and he further distracts them by blessing them with the glory that can only serve as a way station en route of an eternal journey. For Unamuno and for his readers, glory is in the process of distracting his readers from unattainable goals of peace. Unamuno precedes his blessing of glory with this clearly paradoxical proposal: " . . . para distraerte un poco de tus distracciones, me propuse" (295).

Unamuno's above words show his use of an obvious paradox. By distracting his readers from their distractions, Unamuno is adding to and perpetuating their distractions. This use of paradox is a distraction that furthers fertile ground for the reader to gain a

deeper insight and appreciation of paradox. Unamuno enlightens his reader through distraction. His following words imply that one of his ways of distracting the reader is by proudly voicing the virtues of self-contradiction:

> Alguien podrá ver un fondo de contradicción en todo cuanto voy diciendo, anhelando unas veces la vida inatacable, y diciendo otras que esta vida no tiene el valor que se le da. ¿Contradicción? ¡Ya lo creo! ¡La de mi corazón, que dice sí, y mi cabeza, que dice no! Contradicción, naturalmente. ¿Quién no recuerda aquellas palabras del Evangelio: "¡Señor, creo; ayuda a mi incredulidad!"? ¡Contradicción!, ¡naturalmente! Como que sólo vivimos de contradicciones, y por ellas; como que la vida es tragedia, y la tragedia es perpetua lucha, sin victoria ni esperanza de ella; es contradicción. (Del sentimiento trágico de la vida 31)

An analysis of the above words of Unamuno demands an approach from at least two separate levels with distinct and unrelated purposes. One purpose is to cite examples of his self-contradiction. The other is to cite his consecutive expressions that are unrelated and non sequitur. What Unamuno is saying does not cohere with a rational flow of consciousness. Either he is deliberately presenting a barrage of discrete statements so as to distract the reader, or he is unaware that his writing may be showing a momentary lack of logic.

Unamuno's first statement in the above quote deems existence as being at once valuable and worthless. This is a clear example of the self-contradiction and paradox that Unamuno so proudly champions. He then alludes to the conflict between the visceral faith of the heart and the logical reasoning of the mind. This expression flows smoothly from the previous statement. One has faith that life is valuable, but reason dictates the opposite. Unamuno then suggests that one can live only in and by contradiction. He follows this by saying that life is tragedy and perpetual struggle. This idea is disconnected from the previous concept of life as contradiction, and both ideas have nothing to do with the subsequent idea that

without victory or the hope of victory, life is contradiction. Moreover, the lack of victory or hope of victory is unrelated to the fact that life is contradiction.

Some readers of Del sentimiento trágico de la vida may initially presume to find fault and deficiencies in Unamuno's craftsmanship as a philosophical essayist because of the inconsistencies and disconnectedness in his writing. In fact, he is consciously and purposely manipulating his readers by distracting them with such disconnectedness. He is ever acutely mindful and conscious of what he is writing.

Unamuno's consciousness, the eternal loss of which bases his fear of death, may be his most cherished possession, next to paradox. Yet his self-contradictory view regarding consciousness is extremely negative: "La conciencia es una enfermedad" (Del sentimiento trágico de la vida 34). Unamuno's words then imply the identicalness of disease and progress, in reference to the tasting of the fruit of the tree of knowledge (36).

Unamuno's words suggest that consciousness is a "disease" because to be conscious forces one to struggle and to be "without ease." He also implies that progress is a disease, for the same reason. If the human condition is no better today than it was at the beginning of known civilization, progress is a cruel delusion. Thus the erroneous assumption of universal progress is more without ease than the nonexistent progress itself. Unamuno's word for "disease," "enfermedad," from the Latin "infirmus," or "not firm," suggests its relation to the word "unstable." Thus, if both consciousness and "progress" derive from the instability caused by eating of Eden's Forbidden Fruit, one may better understand Unamuno's evaluation of consciousness and "progress" as being "disease." Unamuno says:

> Y acaso la enfermedad misma sea la condición esencial de lo que llamamos progreso, y el progreso mismo una enfermedad.. . . Les prohibió probar del fruto del árbol de la ciencia del bien y del mal. . . Porque el progreso arranca, según esta leyenda, del pecado original. (Del sentimiento trágico de la vida 36)

Unamuno's text implies that he interprets this part of the Bible as meaning that the human being should know only enough for basic survival, and that any knowledge beyond that is superfluous and sinful. This is paradoxical because it runs counter to the mission to overcome the animal state by aspiring to the spiritual realm, of which animals are incapable. This is supposed to distinguish the human from the lower animal form.

Unamuno differentiates between the desire to "needlessly" know for the sake of knowledge, and the need to know only enough to sustain primitive survival. He refers to the latter as paradoxical "unconscious knowledge," without citing the chance that this spontaneous knowledge is not by a single being, but by groups, such as swarms of insects. Humans and beasts share the spontaneity of visceral instinct. The difference is that the single beast is unaware that it knows, while the human being has the reflective knowledge of realizing that he or she indeed knows. Unamuno's text implies as much, as he comments:

> . . . si no pareciese paradójico, podría llamarse conocimiento inconciente, es común al hombre con los animales, mientras lo que nos distingue de éstos es el conocimiento reflexivo, el conocer del conocer mismo. (Del sentimiento trágico de la vida 38)

Visceral emotions, both animal and human, figure strongly with Unamuno's ideas on faith. His words suggest that one does not get faith through reason or logic, even though it is reasonable to embrace faith for the comfort that it provides. His words imply that one needs the whole spectrum of human emotions to authentically practice faith. For faith, the "gut feeling" or hunch trumps intelligent reason or logic, so suggests Unamuno. If this were true, the more primitive the animal is, the stronger its faith would be. One

would expect the opposite, if the human being is indeed at a higher spiritual level than the "lower" creatures.

Unamuno's views on the origins of *homo sapiens* are very paradoxical. He goes from the Creationist theory of Genesis directly into the Evolutionist hypothesis of the origins of the human being. With the former, he elucidates with the usual key names in Genesis, such as Eve, the Fall, Redemption, God, et cetera. He then offers another "version of our origin." Unamuno now discusses how the descent of the human from the apes is a "diseased" situation that leads to constructive and positive consequences. Unamuno's words imply that it is the mutant quality and the imperfections of the human that lead to superior human intelligence, by way of development of the hands and language:

> El agua químicamente pura es impotable. Y la sangre fisiológicamente pura, ¿no es acaso también inapta para el cerebro del mamífero vertical que tiene que vivir del pensamiento? ... y son las manos, como es sabido, grandes fraguadores de inteligencia. Y esa misma posición le puso pulmones, tráquea, laringe y boca en aptitud de poder articular lenguaje, y la palabra es inteligencia. (Del sentimiento trágico de la vida 37)

Thus for Unamuno, the road to evolution from ape to human is paved with negative attributes such as imperfections, deficiencies, and mutation. His words suggest the paradox of hope and faith that spring from the negativity of human existence. Regarding faith, as with most everything he says, Unamuno delivers paradox in what he says and in how he says it. He both refers to paradox and states these references in a paradoxical manner. One may speak of paradox in a nonparadoxical manner, and one may speak in a paradoxical manner without refering to any specific paradox, but Unamuno does both simultaneously. Despite his usual distinction between visceral faith and rational

knowledge, citing the former as being more important than the latter, Del sentimiento trágico de la vida shows Unamuno saying:

> El creer es una forma de conocer, siquiera no fuese otra cosa que conocer nuestro anhelo vital y hasta formularlo. Sólo que el término creer tiene en nuestro lenguaje corriente una doble y hasta contradictoria significación, queriendo decir, por una parte, el mayor grado de adhesión de la mente a un conocimiento como verdadero, y de otra parte una débil y vacilante adhesión. Pues si en un sentido creer algo es el mayor asentimiento que caber dar, la expresión "creo que sea así, aunque no estoy de ello seguro", es corriente y vulgar.. . . La fe más robusta . . . se basa en incertidumbre. . . . La fe supone un elemento personal objetivo. (180)

The last words are oxymoronic and contradictory, because the words "personal" and "objetivo" are virtually opposites, especially regarding faith. If Unamuno is unaware of this paradox, his words at least imply his faith in their authenticity.

Three words ("duda," "ateos," and "negación") in the following quote imply Unamuno's faith in the paradoxical idea that true faith requires a certain amount of doubt:

> Los que sin pasión de ánimo, sin congoja, sin incertidumbre, sin duda, sin la desesperación en el consuelo, creen creer en Dios mismo. . . Que también los demonios creen en Dios, y muchos ateos. . . y se desesperan y niegan por desesperación, y al negar, afirman y crean lo que niegan, y Dios se revela en ellos, afirmándose por la negación de sí mismo. (Del sentimiento trágico de la vida 185)

In this same work, Unamuno observes the situation " . . . oír en su interior su voz sin palabras . . . " (186). This is paradoxical because if thoughts require the presence of words, surely voices need words even more. Notwithstanding, and indeed more paradoxically, body language, which is even stronger than voices, needs no words.

The meaning that a given text communicates to a critic is closely related to the latter's connection to a doubt/faith dynamics. This is a process associated with the credibility and authenticity of the author whose target words the said critic is trying to interpret. Although one might assume that the contradictory nature of Unamuno's words should facilitate critical interpretation more than would the texts of conventional

noncontradiction, the latter are just as easy to critique because dogmatic statements beg the challenge of inquiry and doubt, especially when the critic is determined and engrossed in the particular pursuit of paradox.

Being so intent, the critic needs no explicit paradox within the text of the target author. Paradoxically, a nonparadoxical dogmatic statement is nonetheless paradoxical just by virtue of being dogmatic. For example, Unamuno dogmatically declares that he is self-contradictory, moreover suggesting that there can be no existence without contradiction and paradox (Del sentimiento trágico de la vida 31). In effect, Unamuno can mean the exact opposite of what he says. This negates the polarities of dogma and paradox, so that both are one and the same. By this rationale, anything is possible. Every truth is false, and every falsity is true. For example, one could say that everything exists and nothing exists. Unamuno comes close to saying this, but the Cartesian *cogito* gets in his way. So he settles by saying that maybe nothing exists except his own consciousness and its perceptions. The following shows one of Unamuno's rare ventures into the solipsistic facet of his consciousness, which sharply contradicts the customary and more prevailing social aspect of his awareness:

> ¿Qué es, en efecto, existir y cuándo decimos que una cosa existe? Existir es ponerse algo de tal modo fuera de nosotros, que precediera a nuestra percepción de ello y pueda subsistir fuera cuando desaparezcamos. ¿Y estoy acaso seguro de que algo me precediera o de que algo me ha de sobrevivir? ¿Puede mi conciencia saber que hay algo fuera de ella? Cuanto conozco o puedo conocer está en mi conciencia. No nos enredemos, pues, en el insoluble problema de otra objetividad de nuestras percepciones, sino que existe cuando obra, y existir es obrar. (Del sentimiento trágico de la vida 187-88)

The above quote clearly reflects Unamuno's inclination to solipsism, which is defined by the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language as " 1. The theory that the self is the only thing that can be known and verified. 2. The theory or view that

the self is the only reality." This theory is extremely paradoxical because the "self" perceives this definition from an "objective" source external to the perceiver. Unamuno compounds the paradox by mentioning an objectivity beyond the observer's perceptions. If nothing can exist until it is perceived, objectivity could not exist. Once objectivity is perceived, it likewise cannot exist because the perception of objectivity lies within the confines of the mind of the perceiver. Thus Unamuno's mention of objectivity contradicts his discussion on solipsism. Unamuno further shows his inconsistency at the end of the quote. He states that a thing can exist only if it acts. This is valid from the Heraclitian view of all things being in a process of flux, which constitutes action. Where Unamuno's statement is not valid is in its irrelevance to all of the quote on solipsism that precedes it. Moreover, this irrelevance is more blatant because Unamuno, purposely or not, states this without so much as beginning a new sentence.

Thus Unamuno is theorizing that he cannot verify that anything can exist outside his mind and its perceptions. He is theorizing that whether objectivity can or cannot exist is an insoluble problem. He is stating that to exist is to act, and that the existence of an entity depends on its action. These separate ideas share the fact that they beg to be explored and analyzed for authenticity. Unamuno's criteria of what constitutes truth or falsity lies within an array of possibilities. Based on what he says, he deals with this array from the perspective that most fulfills him. It is this perspective of self-contradiction, inconsistency, and paradox that is Unamuno's most convenient, reliable, and effective literary device.

Whereas dogma demands one absolute truth and one absolute reality, paradox justifies a multitude of both. For example, Unamuno says that to exist is to act. One of his

examples of this is his distinction between the existence of God and the action of God making the person believe. Unamuno's words imply that it is the idea of God's action within the person that makes God existent: "Y aquí volverá a decirse que no es Dios, sino la idea de Dios, la que obra en nosotros" (Del sentimiento trágico de la vida 188).

The above implies that God exists because God's action within the individual makes the belief. Paradoxical is the fact that if God did not exist, individual's would invent God, and this invention would be the result of God's action to make the individual believe. The paradox is that God exists even without existing. Unamuno's words imply not only that truth based on faith is just as valid as truth based on reason, but that both kinds of truth are, at some level, one and the same. Nonetheless, based on Unamuno's idea that an entity must act in order to exist, sameness needs further exploration.

Sameness, as all other entities, abstract or concrete, needs to act in order to exist. Action is a process of change. Thus sameness must change in order to act, and it must act in order to exist. That which changes does not stay the same. Thus sameness must be nonexistent in order to exist. This paradox extends to the Heraclitus/Parmenides dichotomy of all things changing versus all things staying the same. In this sense, that which exists does not exist due to permanent change. This is why Unamuno sees reason and logic as impossible, and faith as the only thing left for him. He paradoxically arrives at this conclusion through his sense of reason. He concludes that nothing can be concluded, and that there can be no faith without doubt. Paradox so permeates his nature that he cannot write without it. Unamuno says:

> El que afirma su fe a base de incertidumbre, no miente ni puede mentir. Y no sólo no se cree con la razón ni aun sobre la razón o por debajo de ella, sino que se cree contra la razón. La fe religiosa, habrá que decirlo una vez más, no es ya tan sólo irracional, es contra-racional. (Del sentimiento trágico de la vida 189)

Unamuno is certain that nothing is certain; he reasons that faith is unreasonable, and his words imply his faith in this paradoxical way of reasoning as being at once reasonable and unreasonable. The operative phrase here is "at once." It is about simultaneity. It is about time.

Unamuno discusses the element of time:

> Atamos el ayer al mañana con eslabones de ansia, y no es el ahora, en rigor otra cosa que el esfuerzo del antes por hacerse después; no es el presente, sino el empeño del pasado por hacerse porvenir. El ahora es un punto que no bien pronunciado se disipa, y, sin embargo, en ese punto está la eternidad toda, sustancia del tiempo. (Del sentimiento trágico de la vida 189)

Unamuno's above words suggest that time is at once both existent and nonexistent because of the evanescence of its three components. The past perpetually vanishes, while it is all that remains. The present is all there is, while it is never here. The future constantly turns the present into the past, even though the future never arrives.

The perception of time is betrayed by the paradoxical interactions of the three components. Does Unamuno's text imply that time could be divided in alternative acculturated ways, or do his words suggest that past, present, and future constitute an immutable law of metaphysics? Could a new kind of consciousness relate to a different kind of relationship between the three components of time and the linguistic signs that label them? How could one use Unamuno's paradoxical ideas about time as a means by which to actualize these possibilities?

Even if there were answers to such questions about the existence and nonexistence of time, they would be superfluous for Unamuno. It is enough for him to formulate questions and to ponder them. He disdains the dogmatic conclusiveness of answers. Above all, Unamuno never strays far from the self-contradiction and paradox on which he apparently thrives. Unamuno says, " . . . se desesperan y niegan por desesperación, y

al negar, afirman y crean lo que niegan . . . " (Del sentimiento trágico de la vida 185). He does not follow this contradiction with any words that could clarify his reason for saying it. This is an example of deliberate contradiction. Nevertheless, he indulges, seemingly unaware, in a paradox by diminishing the importance of knowledge in favor of the visceral emotions of love and faith: " . . . la ciencia sin amor nos aparta de Dios, y el amor, aun sin ciencia y acaso mejor sin ella, nos lleva a Dios . . . " (Del sentimiento trágico de la vida 186). Even though love and faith may be more important than knowledge, Unamuno depends on his knowledge of what he is saying in order to say it.

Another paradox in this work by Unamuno reads: "Y esto de que el individuo sea el fin del Universo lo sentimos muy bien nosotros los españoles" (281). Unamuno ironically cites the collectivity of an ethnic group to praise individualism. Although his foregoing words do not imply his intention of paradox, the following quote suggests a stronger awareness of it: "Y es que Menéndez y Pelayo, cuya filosofía era, ciertamente, todo incerteza . . . " (282). The intention here is obvious.

Unamuno intends to be paradoxical so that he can laugh at the world and at himself as a means to relieve the stress and tedium of the struggle of existence. Another reason is that his social conscience makes him let the masses mock him so as to neutralize the elitist air that his lofty academic position causes.

Unamuno assuages the gravity of his intellectual mien by gloating over his ironic self-contradiction and paradox. The masses instinctively resent and mistrust those of lofty status, be it that of political power or academic influence, so Unamuno mocks himself before his audience can get to him. In this way, Unamuno overcomes the wrath of his

detractors by letting them overcome him with derision. In this respect, he self-identifies with the prime butt of ridicule in the literary world, Don Quixote.

Unamuno cites in Del sentimiento trágico de la vida, the case of his Cervantine hero, the "knight of sad countenance":

> . . . ése sigue animándonos a que nos pongamos en ridículo, ése no debe morir . . . Y Dios se rió paternalmente de él, y esta risa divina le llenó de felicidad eterna el alma . . . Ese Quijote interior que os decía, conciente de su propia trágica comicidad, ¿no es un desesperado? . . . Pero "es la desesperación dueña de los imposibles", nos enseña Salazar y Torres . . . y es de la desesperación y sólo de ella de donde nace la esperanza heroica, la esperanza absurda, la esperanza loca. *Spero quia absurdum*, debía decirse, más bien que *credo* . . . toda una esperanza en lo absurdo racional. (290-91)

The foregoing excerpts from Unamuno's text reflect some of the influence that the novel Don Quixote and its title protagonist have upon Unamuno's paradoxical thought. His words imply that the glory of hope springs from the gloom of despair. Likewise, in the quixotic sense, great heroism springs from the interaction between internal and external ridicule. It is a paradox that self-mockery at once stirs up a barrage of derision against victims while they defend against the onslaught. So imply Unamuno's words in Del sentimiento trágico de la vida, as he discusses Don Quixote: "Y lo más grande de él fue haber sido burlado y vencido, porque siendo vencido es como vencía; dominaba al mundo dándole que reír de él" (291).

Albeit not burlesque, one Unamunian novel is quasi-quixotic. The next chapter, "Chapter 5: Paradox in Unamuno's San Manuel Bueno, mártir (1933)", shows only one obvious similarity between the protagonist parish priest and Don Quixote. They share a holy heroism from unexpected causes, although the solemn priest who is neither self-mocking nor the butt of ridicule differs from the delusional knight. The priest's

problem is guilt, whereas the knight suffers comic but perilous visions. With Unamuno's paradoxical pastor, only the irony hints of humor.

CHAPTER 5
PARADOX IN UNAMUNO'S SAN MANUEL BUENO, MÁRTIR (1933)

Some of the paradoxes that Unamuno expresses in his final novel seem to result from his ambiguous and self-contradictory bent. The setting of San Manuel Bueno, mártir reflects a brooding and moody atmosphere, as if Unamuno were wrapping his ambiguity and nonconclusiveness in a mist, thereby enabling the reader to more easily suspend his or her habitual thought processes.

There is much diversity among critics in regards to how they respond to and interpret what Unamuno writes in this novel. For example, Navajas discusses how Unamuno projects his views on politics through his protagonist Don Manuel. The message seems to reflect Unamuno's being in favor of democracy without hierarchy, and the quality of being "social" without being socially active, lest politics erode one's uniqueness (159-60).

The element of paradox is never far from Unamuno's thought. His protagonist, the parish priest Don Manuel, reflects the author's harmonizing of opposites. His vocation assuages his fear of solitude, while allowing him to maintain his strong sense of individuality. He cleaves to his parishioners while cleaving himself from them. He is fulfilled by their acceptance of and belief in his promise of redemption and heaven, while he cannot believe in the dogma he preaches. The sadness and gloom of the novel is in pardoxical contrast to the serenity of the scenic surroundings.

The introspective tone implied by Unamuno's choice of words portrays the landscape from the outset, including lake, mist, and snow-capped peaks. These represent

Unamuno's guilt-ridden doubt of his faith. His words imply this impressionistic quasi-mystical ambiance. This sets the tone for the paradox that dominates the theme of the novel. A parish priest dedicates his life to his flock, especially the poor and the sick. His devotion interacts with the unbelief that results from his strong sense of logic. He has no belief in what he preaches, only in the need of his parishioners to believe. He struggles with the guilt that he feels for three reasons, any one of which would be enough to emotionally and psychologically torment him.

He feels guilty for not believing in his preaching about salvation and the hereafter, and he feels guilty for the deception and hypocrisy of preaching what he cannot believe. He also feels guilty for using his flock as a means to assuage the guilt of his unbelief, even though this results in his flock's consolation and comfort. Their priest is their only hope. He gives them a spiritual means for their survival. The more strongly he preaches, the guiltier he feels, and this result impels him to preach even more vigorously. Although this is the predominating paradox of the novel, many other examples appear.

The text has the protagonist saying: "¡Mi vida, Lázaro, es una especie de suicidio continuo, un combate contra el suicidio, que es igual . . . " (Obras completas 2 1144). If one is always on the verge of suicide without actually committing it, this process of struggling against self-destruction is a kind of suicide in itself. To indulge such a desperate attitude of hopelessness compromises one's potential quality of life. This paradox of equating suicide with resisting suicide relates to the paradox of creating a belief only for the indigent parishioners. In this way, they live and die with the same consoling peace of faith.

In fact, the "peace" of the rural village allows the priest to live dangerously by more subtle means. For example, his meditative strolls alongside the lake provide the temptation to drown himself. Fighting against the siren-like enticement of the lake is the struggle against suicide, while his customary gravitation to the precipice of a watery grave constitutes his prolonged "continuous" suicide. Don Manuel comes to uneasy terms with the identicalness of life and death, two sides of the same paradoxical coin. He craves death for the guilt of his inability to believe what he hypocritically preaches, and he craves the self-preservation needed for his ministering to his parishioners. His biological instinct to survive for his mission predetermines his will to persist. Antithetically, his will to endure existentially influences his biological instinct. The synthesis for these opposing forces is the paradoxical ongoing interaction between biology and experiential environment on the one hand, and the existential free will on the other.

Don Manuel knows that his life is of great necessity and value to his parishioners, whom he also guiltily uses in his attempt to assuage his guilt. This is the novel's predominant paradox of the preaching that compounds the very guilt that the preaching is supposed to assuage. This is what Unamuno's words in San Manuel Bueno, mártir imply as the author uses the paradox of Don Manuel's simultaneous struggle for and against suicide. This struggle relates directly to his sense of guilt.

Rather than feeling guilty, Don Manuel should bathe in the spiritual glow of his blameless and noble heroism, because no two members of an audience can perceive what one preaches to them in exactly the same way. The gulf between an average individual of the audience and the preacher is yet greater. Thus the preacher, usually far more erudite than the masses receiving the sermon, cannot precisely believe what he or she preaches.

The preacher's personal interpretation of the specific words of the sermon cannot be the same as the interpretation by the masses who hear his or her words.

Clerics well-versed in various sociological, psychological, and philosophical disciplines cannot relate to spiritual matters in the same naive simplistic manner as most of those of the less educated masses. Leaders of any religion must present to their flocks levels of theology to which the followers may relate. This is not a matter of deliberate deception or hypocrisy. Don Manuel provides for his parishioners the faith and moral guidance that they need and want. Faith for the flock is within his sense of pragmatic reason, and the need to provide this for his flock is the focus of his personal faith.

It is Don Manuel's belief that he must existentially pursue his faith in the need for his parishioners to believe in the dogma that he cannot believe. He hides this inability to believe in keeping with the human inclination to keep secret that which causes guilt. Because of this secrecy, one cannot know to what extent Don Manuel's paradoxical plight is common to clergy members of all places, times, and faiths. To his confidant, Don Manuel reveals thoughts that he would never expose to his flock: "¿La verdad? La verdad, Lázaro, es acaso algo terrible, algo intolerable, algo mortal; la gente sencilla no podría vivir con ella. . . . y con la verdad, con mi verdad, no vivirían." (Obras completas 2 1142).

Don Manuel creates for his flock a belief in a dogma, and he creates for himself a belief in the need to make his flock believe in that which best alleviates their misery. This is a case in which the truth would set no one free. It would erode the faith and worsen the mental and emotional balance of Don Manuel's flock. On this level lies the compatibility of the priest's personal faith with his sense of reason.

Nonetheless, any such compatibility exists only while one is conscious of it. No consciousness of anything ever remains within an individual with a constancy of intensity. To reconcile one's faith with reason requires a perpetual reassuring renewal of this consciousness. This entails endless struggle. Unamuno, and by projection, his protagonist Don Manuel struggle to reconcile and make compatible faith with reason.

With his protagonist Don Manuel, Unamuno uses paradox by applying tactics for the priest that are the reverse of his own devices in his "nonfictional" life. For example, whenever Unamuno is reminded of the limitations of logic and reason, he conveniently leaps to the visceral comfort of faith without limit. By contrast, whenever his fictional Don Manuel is reminded of his inability to believe, Unamuno makes his protagonist leap to the desperation of the limitations of logic and reason. The author's words in his novel imply that he is trying to assuage his own guilt by making his priest even more guilty than he is. Even more paradoxical are Unamuno's words that imply his faith in the persuasive authenticity of paradox. Unamuno has faith in his need to reject faith in religious dogma and conclusiveness. He has faith that his kind of faith is more authentic and powerful than the blind faith in the dogma that he rejects. Moreover, his faith in paradox is strengthened by the doubt which such faith also requires. For Unamuno, the open-ended inconclusiveness of these paradoxical circularities instills in his readers the depth of understanding that the relatively superficial plane of dogma cannot reach.

Unamuno is existential because he chooses his world, through his beliefs, with his free will. He is nonexistential because biological and environmental conditioning predetermine what it is that he will believe and choose. He chooses that his protagonist Don Manuel be existential and nonexistential for the same reasons. The paradox of the

latter's existentialism/non-existentialism is that he can choose only what his creator Unamuno writes that his choices shall be. This extends forward to whatever choices that the fictional priest's parishioners make, either collectively or individually, and it extends back to the forces that decide what Unamuno is to choose. Thus the circularity of the paradox of existentialism reveals itself with more clarity. The dichotomy of predeterminism versus free will becomes less problematic when one sees these polarities operating within a circle of paradoxical harmony.

Navajas sheds light on part of this circle as he comments on Unamuno's projection of existentialism through the voice of Don Manuel:

> Ese personaje actualiza la compleja actitud religiosa de Unamuno. Don Manuel es un portavoz del autor que, a través de él, verbaliza su actitud existencial propia del momento de su vida en el que produce el relato. (81)

The reader of Unamuno's final novel San Manuel Bueno, mártir may enhance his or her appreciation of this work in particular, and of existentialist literature in general, by considering the forces that spur Unamuno to write as he does. There is the born writer's need for self-expression. This is filled by informing, entertaining, surprising, or persuading the reader. These are some of the possible goals of a writer. In Unamuno's case, his words imply that he writes so as to balance his visceral emotions with his sense of reason. In order to harmonize the two by neutralizing the discord between them, Unamuno chooses to effect the paradoxical conclusion that the only possible conclusion is that no conclusion is possible.

Unamuno's playful phrasing implies the pride of his skill in writing with inconsistency and paradox. He curses the literary figure for whom he holds deepest reverence, and he boasts of being self-contradictory. The words of his essays imply his aim to resolve his conflicts through paradox. The words in his fiction suggest his intent to

use his characters and his readers as means to deal with his emotions. Anticipating the future reaction of his audience is part of what motivates Unamuno to write. He writes of Don Manuel as though the protagonist eternally existed only for the purpose of Unamuno depicting him in print.

Unamuno deals with his conflicts, in part, through the words and deeds that he assigns to Don Manuel, and through his expectations of the perceptions and interpretations of his readers. Another element is the paradoxical negation of the possibility of knowledge.

For one to claim knowledge of the fact that knowledge is impossible is paradoxical. Through his character Don Manuel, Unamuno struggles not only to reconcile faith with reason, but also to determine which of the two better serves the cause of knowledge. One gains knowledge by learning the limitations of rational knowledge, or reason.

Unamuno existentially chooses his protagonist Don Manuel as a conduit through which the author voices his response to knowledge acquired through the impact of literary influences, in combination with personal life experiences. Because his literary creations lead knowledge out of him (etymology of "educate"), resulting in part of what he believes, and his beliefs influence what he writes, one can recognize a sameness of creating and believing ("crear-creer") or at least a close association of interaction. Unamuno declares: "Porque creer en Dios es, en cierto modo, crearle, aunque El nos cree antes" (Del sentimiento trágico de la vida 153). Throughout this work, Unamuno repeatedly refers to the relationship between creation and belief.

If the will determines what the individual is to believe, then such belief is neither instinctive nor mental knowledge, for the will trumps both. The former provides faith,

and the latter makes two plus two equal four. If instinctive and mental knowledge are identical, it would follow that faith and reason are also identical and reducible to will. Based on this hypothesis, the will trumps both the instinctive and the mental.

Regarding Unamuno's thoughts on knowledge, the arbitrariness of language, conscience, consciousness, and will, and the paradoxical circularities that determine the words and manners with which Unamuno interrelates the above entities, Navajas offers the following observations:

> He concluido que en Unamuno el conocimiento sigue a la voluntad y la arbitrariedad de un signo lingüístico . . . El hombre es una conciencia enferma y culpable. . . . El conocimiento conduce a una situación circular, en la que lo que nos coarta y da dolor es precisamente lo mismo que genera nuestra energía. El conocimiento perturba al mismo tiempo que crea el dinamismo para el progreso. (36)

The above quote implies that Unamuno is opposed to progress and knowledge because it contaminates the purity of the noble savagery attributed to the less advanced cultures. This reflects some of Rousseau's influence on Unamuno. This idea is also coherent with Unamuno's preference for the instinctive spontaneity commonly associated with less developed peoples over the rationally planned contrivances usually linked to advanced civilizations.

Navajas refers to Unamuno's development of the mythology of Rousseau's "noble savage," in which knowledge and civilization are only sick distortions of the "excellent" state of primordial people who lived in harmony with nature and did not need to know how to conquer it. Navajas also says that such creatures never existed in reality, and that Unamuno indulges a nostalgia for an "archetypical paradise" (37).

Unamuno's lyricism in San Manuel Bueno, mártir shows his love of nature. Even as he implies that the breathing of fresh mountain air is a virtual celebration of life,

Unamuno never strays from the idea that life is a minuscule flash within eternity, whose re-entrance via death is always present as the predominant element of the overall bucolic beauty. The text supports this paradoxical concept of life and death being even less than two sides of the same metaphorical coin. The identicalness of life and death places them on only one side of the same coin, and this one side is the unity of polarities that is a major facet that constitutes paradox.

Unamuno's words imply that one is more prone to suicide in a peaceful and serene natural setting than when faced with the violence of nature. The threat of death forces one to cling more tenaciously to life, whereas the complacency of contentment and peace is more conducive to suicidal thoughts. In San Manuel Bueno, mártir, the text shows protagonist Don Manuel speaking to his disciple Lázaro:

> "' . . . la tentación del suicidio es mayor aquí, junto al remanso que espeja de noche las estrellas, que no junto a las cascadas que dan miedo'" (Obras completas 2 1144).

In the case of Don Manuel and Lázaro, their noble deeds and dedication to self-sacrifice constitute a lifestyle that is ostensibly not of "ongoing suicide." Lest one wonders why Unamuno assigns this mind-set to his characters, it may be a result of Don Manuel's guilt of hypocritical preaching. Even so, the comfort and solace that the priest provides for his parishioners should more than assuage his guilt. Nonetheless, Unamuno's text suggests that he may be projecting his feelings via the priest who says, "Sigamos, pues, Lázaro, suicidándonos en nuestra obra y en nuestro pueblo, y que sueñe éste su vida como el lago sueña el cielo" (Obras completas 2 1144).

Unamuno's words imply that he sees every life as a process of suicide in slow-motion. What supports this statement is the fact that he is not inclined to portraying any character in his fictions as ideal paradigms of what a struggle-free existence might be.

Unamuno possibly believes, with some rationale, that all that exists perpetually struggles against its potential nonexistence. Paradoxically and simultaneously, it is the same struggle against both nonexistence and existence, even if only on a particular esoteric level. This explains the above quote in which Unamuno sees life as protracted suicide.

As Unamuno's words imply, such protraction reflects his aim to condition the reader's consciousness to not only accept paradox, but to also search for it as a lifeline to an ever-deepening understanding. Unamuno's words suggest his intent to challenge and blur the commonly received assumptions of the fixed boundaries of the dimensions of time and space. In this way can suicide be "continuous." Whereas the act of self-destruction is commonly perceived as swift and hopefully painless, Unamuno's text implies that the purpose for Don Manuel's life is to existentially and paradoxically sacrifice it through its simultaneous creation and destruction. The protractedness of this process reflects the expansion of the boundaries of time.

The dimension of time is an important element that carries within it paradoxical complexities that Unamuno uses in San Manuel Bueno, mártir. Narrator Ángela cites Don Manuel's comment that reflects his feelings about time and consciousness. This passage illustrates Unamuno's view of nature as mystical:

> "Mira, parece como si se hubiera acabado el tiempo, como si esa zagala hubiese estado ahí siempre, y como está, y cantando como está, y como si hubiera de seguir estando así siempre, como estuvo cuando no empezó mi conciencia, como estará cuando se me acabe." (Obras completas 2 1145)

Unamuno's words imply that the above bucolic scene eternally takes place independently of any consciousness to perceive it. Paradoxically, the scene and the priest's momentary consciousness of it are also interdependent. Don Manuel's consciousness of the bucolic scene depends on the scene's existence at that particular moment, in which such existence

depends upon Don Manuel's perception of it. Because no two persons could perceive of it in exactly the same way, it would not be the same scene for a different person, or even for the same person at a different moment. Thus the scene and the perceiver are mutually independent and dependent simultaneously. This constitutes a specific style of Unamunian paradox that involves the element of time.

Unamuno's words suggest that time and space exist only in the perception of the individual, and that because all objectivity depends on the individual's subjective perception, objectivity is only relative, if it could exist at all. In San Manuel Bueno, mártir, examples of the foregoing idea appear, especially in cases where Unamuno uses paradox by way of words that relate to time. He manipulates the reader's perception of time and space through the suspension of the reader's disbelief, as exemplified in the words in San Manuel Bueno, mártir:

"Y hasta nunca más ver, pues se acaba este sueño de la vida..." (1148).

The word "hasta" implies a progression toward a time when something is supposed to happen. "Nunca más ver" suggests that it will never happen. Unamuno uses this paradox "until we never meet again" to insinuate both the existence and nonexistence of a hereafter in which souls both meet and never meet again. True to his aversion to conclusion, Unamuno does not say whether or not there is an afterlife. He only presents another possibility with which the reader may expand and enrich the mind.

Unamuno encourages his audience to resist the comforts of thoughtless obedience to traditionalism. With his use of paradox, Unamuno spurs his readers to consider the possibilities that the harmony of opposites presents. As in his previously noted "continuous suicide," he makes life and death appear to be two words for the same entity in the text of San Manuel Bueno, mártir: " . . . se muere sin remedio y para siempre

. . . " (Obras completas 2 1148) and " . . . hasta los muertos nos moriremos del todo " (Obras completas 2 1151).

Based on Unamuno's words in the above quotes, life and death are one and the same. He speaks of dying inexorably and forever. This means that one never completes the act of dying, thus one never completes the act of living. Unamuno also has his protagonist saying that he hardly has enough strength except to die: " . . . apenas me siento con fuerzas sino para morir" (1149). These words imply that without enough strength to die, Don Manuel would have to stay alive. In such a case, total depletion of strength would be his only key to survival.

Thus Unamuno's protagonist Don Manuel quotes Calderón in San Manuel Bueno, mártir: " . . . ya dijo que 'el delito mayor del hombre es haber nacido.'. . . Y como dijo Calderón, el hacer bien, y el engañar bien, ni aun en sueños se pierde..." (Obras completas 2 1147-48). Unamuno's words suggest that his protagonist Don Manuel is trying to assuage the guilt of his hypocrisy, albeit benevolent. His situation demands deceiving his followers for what he considers to be their own good. He can blame this destiny on his birth. Thus he makes himself guilty for being born. This is the sin without which he would be unable to seek atonement.

For Don Manuel, based on the foregoing rationale, hypocrisy should be moral and benign if it helps the flock live and die with the least possible amount of discomfort, and the greatest possible amount of spiritual solace. The priest fulfills this aim, and he existentially creates a belief for his people. He makes their individual realities far less painful. Therefore, the priest should feel no guilt, but Don Manuel has a different view. This situation reflects Unamuno's conflict of reason versus faith as he projects it in this

novel, the finale of which reflects his use of paradox to the very end. Averse to conclusion, Unamuno "concludes" with:

> Ni sabe el pueblo qué cosa es fe, ni acaso le importa mucho. . . La novela es la más íntima historia, la más verdadera . . . bien sé que en lo que se cuenta en este relato no pasa nada; mas espero que sea porque en ello todo se queda, como se quedan los lagos y las montañas, y las santas almas sencillas asentadas más allá de la fe y de la desesperación, que en ellos, en los lagos y las montañas, fuera de la historia, en divina novela, se cobijaron. (Obras completas 2 1154)

The first sentence of the above quote implies that those of less faith know it by its absence and care more about it, even though there are many of deep faith who also know what faith is, and also treasure it. It first appears that Unamuno is indulging a generalized supposition, because there is no correlation between faith and one's awareness of having it or one's concern for knowing one has it. At issue is the distinction between blind unthinking obedience to institutionalized faith, such as that of the flock, and existential deliberate faith of deeply thinking individuals. Unamuno's words in the above quote also imply that the parishioners do not know or care about faith because they never had any doubt with which to compare it. This principle also appears in Unamuno's Paz en la guerra, in which his words suggest that, in order to experience peace, one must suffer the war that contains it.

In the case of Unamuno's remark about having faith without knowing or caring about it, the words also insinuate an enigmatic Unamunian contrivance to spur the reader to learn by seeking answers while knowing that such answers cannot exist. This harmonizing of opposites is part of Unamuno's use of paradox as a rhetorical device.

Unamuno's text in the aforementioned quote then speaks of the novel as showing the most intimate and truest history. Unamuno is obviously alluding to his concept of

intrahistoria that also appears in his Paz en la guerra. Chapter II of this project addresses this theme.

Finally, the last part of the foregoing quote relegates the faithful villagers, the "blessed simple souls," to a plane beyond faith and despair, and beyond the confines of history. By Unamuno's words, their timelessness provides them with refuge, in a quasi-metafictional mode, in the novel that contains them.

The author and reader voluntarily engage an unwritten contract. The author presents a measure of imaginary existence and unreal "reality" that offers the reader entertainment, catharsis, enlightenment, or a combination thereof. In so doing, the author displaces a portion of the nonexistence that precedes the existential creation of belief. The reader fulfills his or her role by existentially creating a suspension of disbelief during the reading process. The consequences of these acts include the blurring, erosion, weakening, destabilizing, and negation of the line that is supposed to separate existence from nonexistence, belief from nonbelief, and fact from fiction. The paradox of this situation is that this line of separation and demarcation also serves to connect and harmonize the opposite entities that the line is supposed to separate. Unamuno exemplifies this paradox at the close of San Manuel Bueno, mártir.

In the last quote, Unamuno's words "no pasa nada" imply either that nothing is happening in the novel, or that the quantity of nothingness is related as a notable event, not only in the unreality of the novel, but also in the reality of the world that contains the novel. This is one of the ways in which Unamuno manipulates the line that separates fact from fiction, so as to connect and harmonize the two opposites simultaneously. In effect, the fiction becomes indistinguishable from the world of reality that contains it, and the two freely intermix.

In this way, Unamuno surpasses even the strength of his ambiguous and inconsistent self-contradicting rhetoric. He thus challenges his audience to more than fulfill its role in suspension of disbelief. He spurs his reader to pursue paradox as a vibrant alternative to the paralysis of received and accepted dogmatic conclusiveness perpetuated by societal traditionalism.

To paraphrase the ending words of San Manuel Bueno, mártir, the people took shelter in a "divine novel," beyond hope and desperation, doing this beyond the confines of history. Unamuno's words suggest that the flock makes the existential choice to find refuge, as if they had the option to seek shelter or not. In reality, Unamuno makes them do it, so they have no choice. In another sense, he cannot make the fictitious people do anything, since they do not exist in the reality needed for Unamuno to reach and affect them. Based on what his words suggest, the nonexistent characters are beyond his reach, enabling them to take refuge beyond "faith and despair." The line that separates fact from fiction separates author from characters, to whom history, dealing only with that which existed, is irrelevant. The nonexistence of the flock in the novel's content negates the entire novel, in a sense. The paradox is that the fiction is in a state of both existence and nonexistence.

The form of the fiction and the book that contains it are real, but the content of the fiction is not. The question is whether the form of a fiction can exist without the unreality of its content. If it could, the form would be an empty shell without a novel. Only the unreal substance of the fiction's content can flesh out and validate the form, whereas the form cannot make the fiction real. The fiction's content becomes more real than its form when Unamuno uses the paradoxes that subtly but suitably stretch the intrinsic realities hidden within the fictional content. For example, Unamuno's text reads that the

protagonist Don Manuel's parishioners take refuge in a "divine novel" outside of history. This implies that the chronology that history would order is absent, disallowing the people to exist. Because the people exist "outside of history," and the "divinity" of the novel places it in a realm not of this world, the people are able to take refuge in the novel because both they and divinity are on the same plane of fiction.

Since the novel is "divine," it has no existence in the world of the author or the reader. The words closing the novel imply that the "divinity" of the novel lies in the same dimension as the nonexistence of the parishioners who thereby can gain access to the novel's refuge.

The above leads to the paradoxical question of the exact space and moment in which the real world of the fact of the author connects with the unreal world of the fiction of the novel. It is the gap between the form and the content of the fiction that eludes connection. Fiction exists, but that which the realm of fiction contains is nonexistent. Likewise, nonexistence exists, but that which nonexistence contains cannot exist. Because the existence of nonexistence negates all that exists, it is the existence/nonexistence of this paradox that enables Unamuno's use of paradox in the reality of the form of his fiction's unreal content. That which is fictional is outside of reality, but the fact of being fictional is within it.

As the foregoing shows, the inadequacy of language precludes distinguishing fact from fiction. The individual can know the difference between reality and fantasy, but one cannot prove or communicate the line of demarcation with any oral or written linguistic explanation. The genre, form, structure, and style of fiction are all real. The content of fiction is an entity that exists in reality. Even if the ideas and imaginary and unreal

characters, places, and events depicted within the content of the fiction are fictitious, the fact that there are entities called fictional ideas, characters, places, and events in existence is a real fact. The words that signify these fictitious entities are signifiers that exist in reality.

If the line of demarcation between fact and fiction cannot be proven with language, but can be instinctively sensed by the perceiving subject, one must question whether this sensing and understanding underscores the limitations of words to the point of making language not only deceptive beyond authenticity, but also useless beyond imagination. It is by dint of this hypothesis that one may justify Unamuno's use of paradox in his novel.

It is the reader's interpretation of a text that establishes whether he or she considers the text to be fact or fiction. This interpretation of what the reader perceives at a given time is what separates fiction from nonfictional works. In Unamuno's novel San Manuel Bueno, mártir, there is no doubt that this is a work of fiction. What is important to the reader is not the fact of the work being fiction, but rather the fact that the work causes an impact upon the reader. The reader does not have uppermost in the consciousness the fictitiousness of the novel. The ironic twists in the story appeal to the reader's sense of humor, and he or she finds a measure of aesthetic fulfillment in Unamuno's use of paradox in this novel. Furthermore, the line that separates reality from fantasy, and fact from fiction, may become blurred in the mind of the reader by the paradoxes that Unamuno playfully applies in his San Manuel Bueno, mártir.

CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

This study explores four works of Unamuno, each of which reflects his use of paradox in its own particular way. All of the works express the author's tone of the specific period of his life during which he produced the work. The tone reveals, in part, Unamuno's moods and attitudes of the time, to the extent of their being agonic or contemplative. Most salient is the fact that one conspicuous characteristic provides a thread common to all of these works: Unamuno's use of paradox.

Without mentioning any specific paradoxical philosophy that may have influenced Unamuno during his writing, Blanco Aguinaga observes some of the former's evolving paradoxical feelings about reason and faith:

> De su descubrimiento personal, y quizá para consolarse, deduce Unamuno que todos los hombres, y muy especialmente los metafísicos y los poetas, sufren de su mismo mal: miedo a la muerte, necesidad de un Dios creador de la inmortalidad personal e imposibilidad racional de creer en él. De esta toma de conciencia y de su universalización nace toda su obra. (20)

The foregoing quote applies especially to Unamuno's thought as reflected in his essay treated in this thesis: Del sentimiento trágico de la vida (1913). As the above quote indicates, Unamuno's difficulty to believe in a deity grows commensurately with his need to believe. This is only one source of his paradoxical thinking, and it shows in how he applies it in his works. Blanco Aguinaga further comments on Unamuno's involvement with paradox, as the former discusses the latter's first novel, Paz en la guerra (1897):

> "Enajenamiento, armonía y fusión de los contrarios . . . Esta misma paradoja aparente . . . de la profunda y auténtica paz que bajo toda guerra palpita . . . " (56).

Blanco Aguinaga also notes Hegel's influence upon Unamuno, and the fact that the latter's concept of *intrahistoria* derives from the former: " . . . el concepto de la que Unamuno llamaría la 'intrahistoria' : historia *natural* hegeliana, es decir, *no* historia . . . " (57). This critic also says, " . . . 'la Historia brota de la no Historia' . . . lo contrario de la Historia es la Naturaleza . . . " (183). These remarks seem to render impossible the existence of history as a "natural" entity. Inadequacies of language being what they are, this critic's comments reflect Unamuno's gravitation to any paradoxical idea, such as that which questions the nature of the "unnatural." Unamuno expands upon this concept throughout his Paz en la guerra.

Without mentioning either Hegel, paradox, or Paz en la guerra, Navajas offers a particular view on Unamuno's relationship to history: "La subjetividad de la historia individual se armoniza con la objetividad de la historia colectiva" (181). Regarding another of the four works by Unamuno that this thesis explores, the above critic comments on the protagonist of Niebla. This novel, or *nivola*, as Unamuno calls it, is paradoxical by virtue of its being a metafiction. The protagonist exercises his "free will" through suicide, so as to dominate his predetermined fate. He does this while knowing that he is only an imaginary character whom the author Unamuno is writing. Navajas comments on the suicide of the protagonist of Unamuno's Niebla: "El acto de Augusto significa un modo de autoafirmación frente a las fuerzas externas que le dominan" (58). This metafictional novel by Unamuno portrays the powerful paradox that is the interaction that harmonizes the opposites of free will and predestiny. This paradox prominently defines much of Unamuno's philosophy regarding one fatalistically being a pawn of one's destiny versus one existentially making his or her own fate.

Paradox serves this study in a general capacity, as both a rhetorical device and a philosophical mode. The extent to which this dissertation contributes to knowledge is largely determined by pointing out and analyzing a pattern of Unamuno's use of paradox in the four works that this study explores. A specific example of this pattern is seen in his last novel, San Manuel Bueno, mártir.

The protagonist of the above novel reflects the author's affinity for paradox. The priest Don Manuel suffers the guilt for his reasoning mind's inability to accept the dogma that he so zealously preaches to his faithful and grateful parishioners. He tries to assuage his guilt by preaching with even more impassioned fervor. This only serves to exacerbate his guilt for his hypocrisy and his lack of faith in the dogma. His faith lies in the need for his flock to believe.

This circularity of paradox is further illustrated by the priest's suicidal desperation. As a projection of Unamuno's own personality, Don Manuel simultaneously tries to maintain his individuality while trying to escape from himself. This situation further exemplifies the ironies, ambiguities, self-contradictions, and paradoxes of Unamuno's playful style of rhetoric. As Navajas observes:

> A pesar de la apología del individualismo, Unamuno teme uno de sus efectos: la soledad. Algunos personajes tratan de evadir ese efecto a través de una acción continua anonadante. Don Manuel . . . es un ejemplo: " . . . parecía querer huir de sí mismo, querer huir de su soledad. 'Le temo a la soledad', repetía". (158)

According to Navajas, Unamuno projects his fear of solitude and his struggle to maintain his sense of individuality onto the protagonist of his novel, San Manuel Bueno, mártir. The paradox is, of course, the fact that the more individuality one has, the more one is separated from the masses, resulting in the solitude that, in this case, Unamuno

fears. This paradox is another of the many pointed out in this thesis, which concentrates on Unamuno's consistent use of paradox as a rhetorical device for his literary production.

This study concludes that Unamuno's use of paradox is an important feature throughout his novels and essays. Paradox is less commonly studied than other aspects of Unamuno's literature. The relative scarcity of publications on Unamuno's use of paradox should place this study into a favorable position in regards to current academic discourse about Unamuno and his peers of the so-called "Generation of 1898," as well as in the general field of rhetorical discourse.

Unamuno's words show his justification of his ambiguities, self-contradictions, inconsistencies, and paradoxes. His texts display the simultaneous strength and weakness of words. While paradox preys on the inadequacies and deceptions of language, it is paradoxical that paradox cannot exist without the words upon which it depends for its paradoxical expression.

Unamuno's paradoxical rhetoric celebrates the philosophy of contradiction. His words harmonize opposites. His open-ended and circular approach reflects his aversion to dogma and conclusion. As Barzun observes: "The best minds are often those able to hold two opposed and mutually tempering ideas simultaneously. This is the source of all the dicta in praise of inconsistency and against pure logic" (95).

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I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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